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ARTICLES 
PARTIAL TAKINGS 
Abraham Bell* & Gideon Parchomovsky** 
Partial takings allow the government to expropriate the parts of an 
asset it needs, leaving the owner the remainder. Both vital and 
common, partial takings present unique challenges to the standard 
rules of eminent domain. Partial takings may result in the creation of 
suboptimal, and even unusable, parcels. Additionally, partial takings 
create assessment problems that do not arise when parcels are taken as a 
whole. Finally, partial takings engender opportunities for inefficient 
strategic behavior on the part of the government after the partial taking 
has been carried out. Current jurisprudence fails to resolve these prob-
lems and can even exacerbate them. 
This Article offers an innovative mechanism that remediates the 
shortcomings of extant partial takings doctrines. It proposes that the 
government give owners whose property is partially taken the power to 
force the government to purchase the remainder of the lot at fair market 
value. Exercise of this power by the private owner would lead to the 
reunification of the land in its pretaking form while transferring title to 
the entire parcel to a new single owner—namely the government. 
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Implementation of our proposal would yield important benefits, 
including allowing for the preservation of current parcel configuration, 
lowering the cost of the adjudication process as a whole, and reducing 
the ability of the government to behave strategically. Additionally, our 
proposal would create opportunities for more efficient planning and 
land use by the government as the government would be free to reparcel, 
develop, and resell the parcels sold to it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Partial or incomplete takings allow the government to expropriate 
those particular parts of an asset that it needs, leaving the owner to retain 
the remainder.1 The evidence shows that partial takings are ubiquitous. 
At least in some jurisdictions, partial takings are more common than 
total takings.2 In fact, in some cases, the law of the jurisdiction pushes 
authorities to engage in partial takings rather than complete takings.3 
Partial takings are routinely used when the government engages in pub-
lic construction projects, particularly in the area of transportation.4 They 
are also common in cases in which the government needs to erect 
protective barriers against flooding on beachfront properties and 
riparian lots.5 
At first blush, one might assume that partial takings are more 
efficient and fairer than total takings, as they take no more property than 
necessary. This first impression is incorrect, however. Partial takings 
impose two substantial costs. The first cost is administrative. Because in 
many cases there is no market for the particular slice of the asset seized 
by the government, determining the value of the partial taking (and, 
therefore, the compensation to be paid) is quite difficult and expensive.6 
The second cost relates to the value of the parcel itself. While the partial 
taking is motivated by a government need for the particular slice seized, 
there may be little private use for what remains of the parcel. A partial 
taking may render the remainder practically or legally unfit for ordinary 
use. The remaining land may fail to comply with size or setback 
restrictions or otherwise be no longer fit for use. Likewise, the remainder 
may simply depreciate in value in light of changes effected by the 
government project. Consequently, the partial taking might prove to be 
less efficient than keeping the asset together, even if the government 
were to underutilize some parts of the total asset.7 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See generally Julius L. Sackman, 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 14.01 (3d ed. 
2017) [hereinafter 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain]. 
 2. Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally Blind? 
An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent-
Domain Exercises, 45 J. Legal Stud. 437, 450 (2016) (highlighting a study of takings in 
which only 42% of the observed cases were total takings). 
 3. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1534–37 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding 
that Vermont, as a matter of state law, was required to proceed with a partial taking to acquire 
“only that which it needed” to achieve the state’s goals). 
 4. See Xiaoxia Xiong & Kara Kockelman, Cost of Right-of-Way Acquisition: 
Recognizing the Impact of Condemnation via a Switching Regression Model, 20 J. 
Infrastructure Sys. 04014021-1, 0414021-2 (2014) (summarizing a study showing that in 
excess of 90% of Texas Department of Transportation takings were partial takings). 
 5. See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra notes 36–43 and accompanying text. 
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This Article proposes a new approach to partial takings that 
addresses both aforementioned costs at once. Whenever the government 
elects to engage in a partial taking, the private property owner should be 
given a put option8 that will entitle her to sell the remainder of the lot to 
the government. The exercise price of the put option should be a per-
centage of the fair market value of the asset as a whole, with both the 
percentage and the market value of the whole determined at the time of 
the partial taking. As a consequence of the exercise of the option, the 
title to the parcel would be unified in the hands of the government. And, 
as the new owner of the title to the entire parcel, the government would 
have full discretion as to how to use or dispose of the parcel in the 
future. 
Under present law, the power of eminent domain grants the gov-
ernment what is functionally a call option9 over all private property. The 
government’s call option is exercisable at fair market value and is subject 
to the largely toothless public use requirement in the Constitution.10 
Extant law recognizes no such option in private parties to buy or sell 
land. The introduction of our mechanism would give private property 
owners a limited put option, exercisable at fair market value in a small set 
of cases: those in which the government decided to use its call option to 
take only part of the land of an individual owner. 
As an illustration of how our proposed system would work, consider 
the following example. Assume that the government wants to expand the 
street adjacent to Abby’s land. The government does not need all of 
Abby’s land to widen the street; it therefore takes 68% of Abby’s parcel by 
eminent domain. Assume, further, that the fair market value of Abby’s 
parcel is $100,000 and that, prima facie, all parts of the land are of equal 
value. Under current law, the baseline for compensating Abby will be the 
amount of $68,000 for the part taken.11 In addition, Abby can demand 
additional compensation for the “severance harm” she suffered and for 
                                                                                                                           
 8. A put option empowers the option holder to sell a good, entitlement, or future 
commodity to a certain counterparty at a preset price or a price to be decided in the future. See 
Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 Val. U. L. Rev., 793, 796 (1998) [hereinafter Ayres, 
Protecting Property]; Put Option, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ 
putoption.asp [http://perma.cc/5ZQA-XZSD] (last visited Sept. 19, 2017); see also infra 
section II.A. 
 9. A call option allows the option holder to purchase an asset, entitlement, or future 
commodity from a certain counterparty at a preagreed price or at a price to be determined in 
the future. See Ayres, Protecting Property, supra note 8, at 796; Call Option, Investopedia, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/calloption.asp [http://perma.cc/SPY3-UZD7] (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2017); see also infra section II.A. 
 10. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 
Colum. L. Rev. 1412, 1423 (2006) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of 
Public Use] (describing the libertarian criticism that Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469 (2005), failed to narrow the Supreme Court’s public use doctrine). 
 11. In our example, we presumed that the taken land was not only 68% of the whole 
in size but also 68% of the whole in value. This presumption is unlikely to bear true in 
reality. 
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the diminution in value of the remainder.12 The government may seek to 
offset compensation with the value of certain benefits the taking bestows 
upon Abby’s remaining property.13 Note, however, that the severance and 
diminution harms are very difficult to substantiate and that proving them 
imposes considerable costs on Abby—in both money and time. Under 
our proposal, Abby would have the option of sidestepping the procedure 
of proving severance and diminution harms by simply forcing the 
government to take her lot in its entirety and pay the market value of her 
entire lot (i.e., $100,000).14 
It bears emphasis that we do not propose forcing the government to 
retain title to the remainder it would receive via exercise of put or call 
options. On the contrary, the government would acquire the prerogatives 
of the owner and thus retain complete liberty in deciding what to do with 
the land it receives. The government could either retain the entire 
parcel, if it preferred, or reparcel the land in any way it wanted and sell 
parts on the open market. 
Our proposal presents four advantages over the current legal regime. 
First, it prevents the creation of parcels that are suboptimally configured 
for use. Under our proposed regime, were a partial taking to threaten to 
leave the remainder unfit for use, the owner (or the government) would 
exercise her put (or its call) option to stop this result from occurring. 
Second, and relatedly, our proposal creates a readily available mecha-
nism for reuniting the title to the lot as a whole in the hands of a single 
owner, thereby preempting the creation of negative externalities that 
tend to arise in cases of split ownership. Concretely, our mechanism 
                                                                                                                           
 12. See infra section I.B.2. 
 13. See infra section I.B.1. 
 14. An integral component of our proposal is the determination of the ratio of the 
value of the part of the land taken to the value of the land as a whole. Knowing the value 
ratio is essential to setting the strike price of the call and put options (i.e., the amount the 
government would have to pay Abby in the event the option were exercised). Indeed, in 
many senses, the value ratio is the strike price. In our example, if the ratio were 68%, the 
strike price would be 32% of the value of the lot as a whole—$32,000. If the option were 
exercised at a later time, the strike price would have to be adjusted by the relevant 
measure of inflation, which would be the price index for realty. 
We suggest two alternative ways of establishing the strike price. The easiest way would 
be to carry forward current doctrines for establishing the value of partial assets. Courts 
would use these doctrines to determine the value of the taken land, which, when 
compared with the value of the asset as a whole, would yield the value ratio. An alternative 
means for establishing the ratio would be to allow either the government or the aggrieved 
owner to set the ratio or even to set the ratio arbitrarily at the percentage in size, rather 
than value, of the land taken as compared to the plot as a whole. Size is easier to measure, 
and, of course, self-assessment may lead to the revelation of private information. This 
alternative would obviously create some interesting strategic pressures to overstate or 
understate value (in the case of self-assessment) or otherwise to take advantage of the gap 
between size and actual value. However, availability of the put and call options would 
correct any misincentives created by the gap between stated and actual value ratios. See 
infra sections II.A–.B. 
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ensures that over time the government does not increase or change the 
nature of its use of the parts taken in a way that harms the remainder. 
Third, our mechanism creates an incentive for the government to engage 
in more efficient planning and land-development policies. In many 
eminent domain projects, the government takes title to multiple parcels 
and can, therefore, unlock synergies across parcels that owners of 
individual lots cannot possibly unlock or even envision. Fourth, and 
finally, at least in some variants, our proposal creates significant cost sav-
ings, relative to the existing rule, by obviating the need to appraise the 
value of the part that remains in the hands of the private owner after the 
taking. Indeed, our proposal can sometimes suffice with appraising the 
value of the parcel as a whole, which should be a much easier task. 
While our proposal is self-contained, it has obvious implications for a 
number of other issues in the world of takings. Accordingly, after pre-
senting our proposal, we briefly discuss several potential extensions. We 
demonstrate how a mechanism of self-assessment can be incorporated 
into our basic model and analyze how it would change the incentives of 
the parties. Next, we examine how our basic model for partial takings of 
land can be used in the contexts of partial takings of chattel. Finally, we 
look at whether our model can be used to address issues of partial regu-
latory takings and conclude that it cannot. 
Structurally, the Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we position 
the phenomenon of partial takings within the larger framework of 
eminent domain and discuss the rationales that have been proffered to 
support the practice. Additionally, we enumerate the drawbacks that 
attend partial takings and the costs they impose on society. In Part II, we 
present our reform proposal. Drawing on the rich literature on the use 
of options within law, we detail the option mechanism with which we seek 
to replace the current legal regime. In Part III, we consider several 
potential objections to our model. Specifically, we look at whether the 
model should apply to very small takings, and we introduce a de minimis 
limitation into our basic model. Additionally, we consider the possible 
impact on state holdings of land and the potential constitutional 
limitations on our model. Finally, in Part IV, we contemplate and evaluate 
several extensions of our model by offering an alternative self-assessment 
valuation mechanism for determining the price of the options, extending 
our model to partial chattel takings, and assessing the applicability of our 
model to partial regulatory takings. A short conclusion ensues. 
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF PARTIAL TAKINGS 
A. Partial and Other Takings 
The government typically takes property by eminent domain when it 
needs the property for a purpose other than that to which it is currently 
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put to use.15 It will not generally take farmland to establish a government 
farm but rather to build a road. The physical configuration that fits the 
old use of the property often does not match the new use of the property. 
A narrow strip of land suffices for a highway; the entire farm is rarely 
needed.16 
For this reason, partial takings are ubiquitous. It is reasonable to 
estimate that there are at least as many partial takings as total takings in 
some jurisdictions.17 We suspect that most government projects do not 
require seizures of lots in their entirety and that the government has no 
need to take an entire parcel of land when a part will do. Construction or 
expansion of roads, trails, railroad tracks, or other forms of infrastruc-
ture almost always relies on partial takings. As an illustration, consider 
the case of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that the placement of cable on private buildings in 
New York City, together with a small box on the roof, amounted to a 
partial taking that required the payment of compensation to the building 
owners.18 
Partial takings are common in yet another category of cases: beach 
replenishment.19 Consider the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. The storm 
had destroyed coastal dunes, laying bare the littoral oceanfront proper-
ties.20 To protect these properties, as well as the safety of the public at 
                                                                                                                           
 15. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472–75  (discussing the constitutionality of government 
use of eminent domain to transform condemned residential property into mixed-use 
development); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (holding that use of 
eminent domain to correct market failures in real property was a proper application of 
public use under the Fifth Amendment); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954) 
(holding that the government interest of addressing urban blight was a proper application 
of public use under the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 370 
(1943) (noting that condemnation of a strip of private land for public railroad use was 
necessary); Julius L. Sackman, 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.01 (3d ed. 2017) 
[hereinafter 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain]. 
 16. See Julius L. Sackman, 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.02(2)(b) (3d ed. 
2017) [hereinafter 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain] (detailing the government’s authority 
to condemn private property for various public uses, including highways); 2A Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, supra note 15, § 7.06 (highlighting the taking of private property for a 
public highway as the oldest of many valid public uses); see also Ellen Frankel Paul, 
Property Rights and Eminent Domain 7–14 (1987) (describing the concept of eminent 
domain); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, The Economics of Eminent Domain: 
Private Property, Public Use, and Just Domain, 3 Found. & Trends Microeconomics 275, 
280–82 (2007) (providing an overview of case law relating to eminent domain). 
 17. See, e.g., Levine-Schnur & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 450 (highlighting that 
58% of the 3,140 takings in Tel Aviv, Israel, between 1990 and 2014 were partial takings). 
 18. 458 U.S. 419, 425–41 (1982). 
 19. See James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to 
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1279, 1299–
301, 1346 (1998). 
 20. Jenny Anderson, Rebuilding the Coastline, but at What Cost?, N.Y. Times (May 18, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/nyregion/rebuilding-the-coastline-but-at-what-
cost.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); St. Petersburg Coastal & Marine Sci. Ctr., 
2050 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:2043 
 
large and the coastal systems, the state governments of New Jersey21 and 
New York22 committed to reconstituting the coastal dunes, partly on pub-
lic property but mostly on private land. The measures involved multiple 
partial takings that attracted the wrath of certain private property owners 
and triggered litigation.23 
Another category of cases that has occasioned partial takings consists 
of the expansion of riverbeds or navigational routes.24 Such changes in 
the layout of rivers invariably involve reconfiguration of the boundaries 
of riparian lots. While such adjustments typically involve multiple lots, it 
is possible that, in some cases, only one lot will be affected. 
In all these cases, the government needs only a portion of existing 
parcels of land for its project. A partial taking, therefore, gives the gov-
ernment what it needs for its project while saving valuable resources. 
This is because the law of eminent domain requires the government to 
pay only for what it takes.25 Hence, the government will often allow a par-
tial taking to suffice for financial reasons. In some cases, state law even 
requires the state to proceed with a partial taking when that is all that is 
necessary to achieve the state’s aim.26 
                                                                                                                           
Hurricane Sandy Response—Storm Impacts and Vulnerability of Coastal Beaches, U.S. 
Geological Survey, http://coastal.er.usgs.gov/sandy-storm-impact-vulnerability/research/ 
coastal-impacts.html [http://perma.cc/28Z2-ZQ7W] (last modified Dec. 5, 2016) (describing 
the damage from Hurricane Sandy). 
 21. See Leslie Garisto Pfaff, Sea Change: Post-Sandy Rebuilding, N.J. Monthly (Dec. 
11, 2012), http://njmonthly.com/articles/jersey-shore/sea-change-post-sandy-rebuilding 
[http://perma.cc/M3UX-BR7R]; Elise Young, New Jersey Shore Towns Challenge Sand Dunes 
Plan as Storms Gather, Ins. J. (May 5, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/ 
2016/05/05/407618.htm [http://perma.cc/8BSK-JQYB]. 
 22. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Fire Island Residents to Lose Their Homes to Make Way for a 
Dune, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/nyregion/some-
houses-on-fire-island-to-be-torn-down-to-make-way-for-new-dune.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review); De Blasio Administration Releases Progress Report on Sandy Recovery and 
Resiliency, NYC.gov (Oct. 22, 2015) http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/749-15/de-
blasio-administration-releases-progress-report-sandy-recovery-resiliency [http://perma.cc/JX6B-
39Y9]. 
 23. Wayne Parry, Beachfront Owners Challenge Sand Dunes Plan, Courier-Post (Jan. 21, 
2016), http://www.courierpostonline.com/story/news/local/south-jersey/2016/01/21/beach-
property-lawsuit/79116298 [http://perma.cc/TE4W-SJS4]; see also Matthew Hromadka, 
Comment, The Price of Protection: Compensation for Partial Takings Along the Coast, 30 
Touro L. Rev. 861, 876–77 (2014); Louis M. Russo, Note, From Railroads to Sand Dunes: An 
Examination of the Offsetting Doctrine in Partial Takings, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1539, 1541 
(2014). 
 24. See, e.g., Hromadka, supra note 23, at 875–76 (discussing United States v. Fort Smith 
River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1965)). See generally Richard S. Harnsberger, Eminent 
Domain and Water Law, 48 Neb. L. Rev. 325 (1969) (examining just compensation as it relates 
to “water development and allocation”). 
 25. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 Va. L. Rev. 
277, 279 (2001) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed]. 
 26. A statute of this kind was the source of the decision to take only an easement for 
a railroad track, which led to the litigation of Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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It is worth noting another important aspect of partial takings: Partial 
takings cases paradigmatically implicate the core justifications for the 
existence of a power of eminent domain. Accepted lore justifies the 
power of eminent domain on the grounds that it is necessary to 
overcome the twin problems of high transaction costs and holdouts that 
would otherwise undermine the government’s ability to carry out 
valuable social projects.27 The takings literature suggests that high 
transaction costs are positively correlated with the number of lots 
affected.28 Specifically, the more private lots a project involves, the more 
rights the government will need to clear, and the higher the cost of the 
project will rise. The holdout problem, by contrast, arises whenever the 
government must gain access to a particular lot.29 In such cases, in a world 
without eminent domain, the relevant private owner could try to extract 
the entire surplus arising from the project before consenting to the 
transaction.30 The holdout problem arises when the government has no 
reasonable substitutes to a particular parcel and must appropriate that 
parcel alone.31 
The twin problems of high transaction costs and holdouts are 
endemic to projects that rely on partial takings. Almost inevitably, partial 
takings rely on particular parcels, making the partial taking highly vul-
nerable to holdouts. At the same time, while partial takings may not 
involve a large number of parcels, the transaction costs associated with a 
partial taking can be quite high. This is due to the particular problems 
partial takings raise—particularly in establishing the value of the partial 
lots taken—that we explore in depth later in this Part.32 In order to take 
property by eminent domain, the state must pay “just compensation” to 
the owner whose property is taken.33 Figuring out the amount that con-
                                                                                                                           
 27. Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An 
Empirical Assessment, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 937 (2017). 
 28. See Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law 216–17 (2004); Lloyd 
Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. Legal Stud. 351, 356 (1991); Daniel B. Kelly, 
Acquiring Land Through Eminent Domain: Justifications, Limitations, and Alternatives, in 
Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law 343, 345–50 (Kenneth Ayotte & 
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Land Assembly and 
the Holdout Problem Under Sequential Bargaining, 14 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 372, 374–75 
(2012). 
 29. The need for a particular lot and the need for many lots are not mutually 
exclusive. For instance, the collection of many lots to build a road may make particular lots 
necessary in order to complete the road. 
 30. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1106–07 (1972); 
Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segersen, Holdups and Holdouts: What Do They Have in 
Common?, 117 Econ. Letters 330, 332 (2012). 
 31. Of course, the parcel may be needed in conjunction with other parcels to enable 
the government use. 
 32. See infra section I.C. 
 33. The just compensation requirement appears not only in the U.S. Constitution, 
which guarantees “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
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stitutes “just compensation” is a perennial difficulty.34 Calculating com-
pensation for partial takings is far more difficult35 and, concomitantly, 
more expensive. 
The choice of whether to pursue a partial taking is thus a difficult 
one for the state. Partial takings may reduce the amount of direct com-
pensation paid by the government for property, but at the same time, 
they create additional costs that must be borne, in part, by the state. 
A further complication is added by the fact that the state’s decision 
to pursue a partial taking does not take full account of the social costs 
engendered by such takings. 
Full and accurate compensation for takings is indispensable to the 
proper functioning of the government’s power of eminent domain.36 
Accurate compensation is necessary for three distinct reasons. First, 
accurate compensation ensures fairness for aggrieved owners by ensuring 
that individual property owners are not forced to bear costs that ought 
rightly to be borne by society as a whole.37 Second, accurate compen-
sation ensures that government decisionmakers do not suffer from “fiscal 
illusion”—the illusion that social costs matter only when they find 
expression in government budgets.38 Third, and finally, accurate com-
                                                                                                                           
compensation,” U.S. Const. amend. V, but also in state constitutions. Julius L. Sackman, 1 
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.3 (3d ed. 2017). Indeed, the compensation requirement 
is understood around the world to be a necessary companion to the power of eminent 
domain. Simon Keith et al., Food Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Compulsory 
Acquisition of Land and Compensation 11–15 (2008), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/ 
i0506e/i0506e00.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also 1A Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, supra note 16, § 1C.02. 
 34. Patrick J. Rohan & Melvin A. Reskin, 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain § G31.04 (3d 
ed. 2017) [hereinafter 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain]; Katrina Miriam Wyman, The 
Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 239, 252–61 (2007); see also infra 
note 40. 
 35. Julius L. Sackman, 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 8A.02 (3d ed. 2017) 
[hereinafter 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain]. 
 36. See Bell & Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, supra note 10, at 1416–17. 
 37. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (articulating this 
rationale). 
 38. There is an ongoing debate about the degree to which fiscal illusion actually 
occurs in the real world. In support of the theory that fiscal illusion impacts government 
decisionmaking, see, e.g., David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 41–46 
(2002); Thomas J. Miceli, Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation 141 
(1997); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 56, 73–74 (2007); Lawrence Blume 
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 
569, 620–28 (1984); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. 
Rev. 509, 567–70 (1986). But see Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 
130 (2004) (questioning the fiscal illusion theory as a justification for the compensation 
requirement); Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 
Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 7–16 (2016) (arguing the fiscal illusion theory incorrectly assumes 
government officials are driven by maximizing fiscal returns); Yun-Chien Chang, Empire 
Building and Fiscal Illusion? An Empirical Study of Government Official Behaviors in 
Takings, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 541, 544 (2009) (finding that in Taiwan, local 
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pensation reduces the possibility (and therefore the incentives) for gov-
ernment actors to utilize their taking power for corrupt purposes.39 
When compensation does not accurately measure the costs imposed by 
takings, the takings power can be misused or abused. This is no less true 
when the taking is a partial one. 
Unaccounted-for costs and benefits are endemic to all takings and, 
in particular, to partial takings. Many scholars have argued that standard 
compensation formulas for all exercises of eminent domain fail to take 
account of some kinds of subjective value enjoyed by owners.40 Addition-
ally, government benefits that accompany takings are generally not given 
expression in compensation formulas.41 Finally, not all “takings” of 
property are compensable. A complicated set of judicially crafted 
formulas distinguish between, on the one hand, ordinary government 
actions that take valuable property rights and attributes without the need 
for compensation and, on the other hand, those that go “too far” and 
become “regulatory takings” for which compensation must be paid.42 
“Partial regulatory takings,” in particular, do not trigger a compensation 
requirement, unless, like other regulatory actions, they go “too far.”43 
                                                                                                                           
governments are sensitive to political costs and benefits when assessing land value); Daryl 
J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 377 (2000) (challenging the fiscal illusion 
theory as a justification for takings compensation). 
 39. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings 
Compensation, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1692–704 (2010). 
 40. E.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 
Stan. L. Rev. 871, 872–73 (2007) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation 
Private]; James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent 
Domain, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1292 (1985); John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity 
of Home, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 783, 790 (2006); James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not Be 
Moved”: Urban Communities, Eminent Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just 
Compensation, 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 923, 940 (2006); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, 
Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 859, 866; Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public 
Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 83 (1986); see also Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and 
the Condemnation of Future Interests: Empirical Evidence of the Failure of Fair Market 
Value, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 789, 793–94. 
 41. See infra section I.B.1. 
 42. There is a vast literature on regulatory takings, including Steven J. Eagle, 
Regulatory Takings (5th ed. 2012); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the 
Power of Eminent Domain (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Takings: Private Property]; 
William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (1995); Lawrence 
Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should 
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. Econ. 71 (1984); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 
Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. Legal Stud. 749 (1994); 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private 
Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971). 
 43. John D. Echeverria, Partial Regulatory Takings Live, but . . . , in Taking Sides on 
Takings Issues: The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra 67, 67 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); Richard 
A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1369, 1377–78 (1993) [hereinafter Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina] (stating that 
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These valuation problems associated with ordinary takings are even 
more severe in the case of partial takings. Partial takings involve the 
seizure of partial assets. This means that the seized property may have no 
market in which value can be measured. In addition, the seizure of one 
partial asset leaves behind a different partial asset. The effect of the 
seizure on the partial asset left behind must also find expression in 
valuation formulae. 
In sum, partial takings are both extremely popular and extremely 
problematic. Partial takings are supported by the justifications support-
ing ordinary takings and troubled by the difficulties attending them. Yet, 
partial takings also have unique aspects that make them both particularly 
useful and unusually problematic. Ideally, the legal treatment of partial 
takings would ameliorate these problems. Unfortunately, the law’s treat-
ment of partial takings seems more likely to exacerbate them. It is to this 
troubling feature of the law of partial takings that we now turn. 
B. Special Doctrines of Partial Takings 
This section explores the judicial treatment of partial takings. Courts 
have fashioned many special doctrines to deal with compensation for 
partially taken parcels of land. The doctrines, as this section will demon-
strate, deal with only some of the challenges partial takings pose. In some 
ways, the doctrines may be said to worsen the already extant challenges. 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand the conun-
drums posed by compensating for partial takings. In general, takings 
compensation aims to give the owner of the taken property money in the 
value of the taken property.44 Prima facie, if the state takes one-third of 
Blackacre, it should give the owner one-third of the value of Blackacre. 
But in reality, matters are not so simple. Blackacre may not be of con-
sistent quality; part may be rocky, and the rest flat. Moreover, taking one-
third of Blackacre affects the value of the remaining two-thirds. It may no 
longer be possible to use Blackacre in the same way as before—the lot, 
for instance, may no longer be large enough to grow certain crops. And 
new uses of Blackacre may now be possible—for example, the new road 
created in part from the taken property may enable a new factory to get 
products to the market cost efficiently. The relationship between the 
partial taking and the value of what remains of Blackacre is a complex 
                                                                                                                           
partial takings, while virtually total in form, will remain uncompensated under the Court’s 
current approach). 
 44. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, supra note 40, at 872–
73; see also Patrick J. Rohan & Melvin A. Reskin, 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain § G18.02 
(3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain]; 4A Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, supra note 1, § 14.01. 
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one. This relationship is the source of a variety of special doctrines for 
adjusting compensation awards in cases of partial takings.45 
1. Offsets. — One of the most litigated questions of partial takings 
compensation is the “offset.” In most cases, an “offset” reduces compen-
sation for partial takings.46 
To understand offsets, we must recall that all takings—not just par-
tial takings—produce multiple effects, some positive, some negative.47 
For instance, when the state uses the power of eminent domain to take 
land to build a road, the landowners lose the assets taken by the state, but 
the remaining owners gain the value of easier access to their land. 
Indeed, given the constitutional requirement that takings be justified by 
a “public use,”48 it is near impossible to think of a taking without an 
accompanying benefit to at least one person.49 In most cases, the law 
treats the costs and benefits entirely separately. The losses the owners 
suffer as a result of the government’s takings are compensated. The 
benefits owners enjoy as a result of the government’s givings are over-
looked.50 
In the case of partial takings, however, matters are different. Under 
both state and federal law of takings compensation, when deciding on 
the compensation to award owners suffering a partial taking, courts take 
into account both costs and benefits.51 In the language of the law, com-
pensation for the taking is “offset” by the value of the benefit realized by 
the owner. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that such offsets are 
constitutional and do not run afoul of the constitutional requirement of 
“just compensation” for takings.52 
While it has a great deal of intuitive appeal, a doctrine of offsetting 
compensation by the value of benefits actually creates three different sets 
of difficulties. First, the doctrine is difficult to apply. It is difficult enough 
to measure land value;53 it is much tougher when the effects of govern-
ment projects must be disentangled from all the other factors affecting 
                                                                                                                           
 45. See generally 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 1, § 14.03 (exploring 
the special valuation issues associated with partial takings). 
 46. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.02; 4A Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, supra note 1, § 14.03. 
 47. Bell & Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, supra note 25, at 290. 
 48. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 49. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 565 (2001) 
[hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings] (“Thus, any taking must confer some benefit 
on the public.”). 
 50. Id. at 549. 
 51. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.02; 4A Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, supra note 1, § 14.03. 
 52. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897). In some states, the benefits may offset 
only severance damages but not the compensation for the property taken. See, e.g., Done 
Holding Co. v. State, 534 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. Div. 1988); State v. Meyer, 403 S.W.2d 366, 374 
(Tex. 1966); City of Richardson v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 933, 940 n.4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
 53. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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land value. All states eliminate from the offset valuation effects that are 
not attributable to government action, and the version of the doctrine 
most jurisdictions use involves an even more difficult exercise of line-
drawing between government-created effects that are legally important 
and those that are not. Second, the doctrine does not apply solely to par-
tial takings but also to cases in which a landowner owns multiple parcels. 
This means that application of the doctrine depends on the identity of 
the landowner, rather than simply the nature of the asset.54 Third, and 
finally, by offsetting benefits only for partial taking compensation but not 
for other takings or government actions, the doctrine actually creates a 
perverse incentive. It encourages the state to prefer partial takings to 
reduce the amount of compensation to be paid. Let us examine each of 
these in turn.  
The doctrine of offsets is not as simple as it sounds.55 At least in 
some states, the compensation award is not adjusted for all benefits real-
ized by the owner. Courts draw a distinction between “special benefits”—
benefits that are “direct and peculiar to the particular property”56—and 
“general benefits,” which accrue to the many properties in the area.57 In 
most states and at the federal level, courts reduce the compensation 
award (or offset it, in the preferred terminology) by the value of special 
benefits realized by the owner of the taken property.58 The offset 
doctrine thus benefits the government in partial takings cases by allowing 
it to pay less compensation than it would have to pay in ordinary takings. 
However, the state reduces costs only to the extent of special, but not 
general, benefits created by the government project. 
While it is easy to grasp the conceptual difference between special 
and general benefits, it is much harder to identify them in practice. 
Consider, for instance, the case of Defnet Land & Investment Co. v. State ex 
                                                                                                                           
 54. For those who support incorporating broader concerns of distributive justice into 
eminent domain compensation awards, this can be seen as a feature, rather than a bug. 
See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741, 746 (1999). 
However, it remains difficult to explain why the distributive justice concerns should enter 
into the picture only in the case of partial takings. Cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In 
Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 326, 329 (2006) 
(defending more broadly the use of private law to effect redistribution); Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response to Professor Dagan, 99 Mich. 
L. Rev. 157, 158 (2000) (arguing against Dagan’s proposal). 
 55. For a summary of the different state and federal approaches to offsets, see 
generally 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.03. 
 56. United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1967) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 2,477.79 Acres of Land, 259 F.2d 23, 28 (5th Cir. 
1958)). 
 57. Richardson v. Big Indian Creek Watershed Conservancy Dist., 151 N.W.2d 283, 
286 (Neb. 1967) (“[G]eneral benefits are those which arise from the fulfillment of the 
public object which justified the taking . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Backer v. City of Sidney, 89 N.W.2d 592, 592 (Neb. 1958))). 
 58. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.03. 
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rel. Herman.59 The State of Arizona had decided to widen a highway, and 
it therefore seized by eminent domain roughly thirteen acres of land 
from a tract of 120.75 acres owned by the aggrieved landowner.60 The 
state agreed to pay compensation for the taken land, as well as severance 
damages, but it sought to offset the reward by applying the value of 
“special benefits” the land enjoyed due to the highway expansion.61 
Specifically, the state argued that the remaining land was more valuable 
because the highway expansion brought an interchange in close proxim-
ity to the affected land.62 The landowner challenged this argument on 
the grounds that proximity to highway interchanges should never be 
considered a “special” benefit.63 The landowner also noted the oddities 
of the particular case—that before receiving the “benefit” of the widened 
interstate highway, the land enjoyed direct access to a much longer 
stretch of the unimproved highway, while the new interchange itself was 
not located on the taken land but, rather, nearby on other taken land.64 
The court rejected the landowner’s argument, ruling that proximity to 
highway interchanges might or might not constitute special benefits, 
depending on the circumstances, including such matters as the amount 
of traffic on the highway and the amount of distance from the inter-
changes.65 The rule, in other words, is that benefits must be examined ad 
hoc, and there are no firm guidelines for distinguishing the general from 
the special benefits. 
With the distinction between special and general benefits boiling 
down to a fact-intensive but legally vague judicial determination, it is 
unsurprising that disagreements between state and landowner are 
frequent, and litigation common. The need to distinguish between the 
effects of specific and general benefits also complicates the appraisal 
process, since appraisers must discern not only the degree to which a 
property’s price has been affected by a taking but also the degree to 
which other properties’ prices have been affected by the same taking. 
A small number of jurisdictions have set aside the distinction 
between special and general benefits. For instance, in a controversial 
recent decision,66 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court eliminated the long-standing distinction between general 
                                                                                                                           
 59. 480 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971). 
 60. Id. at 1014–15. 
 61. Id. at 1015. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1019. 
 65. Id. at 1019–20. 
 66. See William J. Ward, NJ Supreme Court Overturns Karan, Changes Rules on Partial 
Takings, N.J. Eminent Domain Blog (July 8, 2013), http://www.njeminentdomain.com/ 
state-of-new-jersey-nj-supreme-court-overturns-karan-changes-rules-on-partial-takings.html 
[http://perma.cc/SS4W-3QC7] (describing the decision as opening “a virtual Pandora’s 
box of issues for trial judges”). 
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and special benefits in New Jersey law and expanded the offset doctrine 
to cover all benefits engendered by any takings project.67 The case 
involved the restoration of sand dunes.68 The Karans owned a single-
family beachfront home in Harvey Cedars, New Jersey.69 As part of its 
efforts to protect the beaches from erosion by rebuilding sand dunes, the 
Borough of Harvey Cedars took a perpetual easement over roughly one-
quarter of the Karans’ property.70 The state sought to pay compensation 
only for the actual reduction in value to the Karans’ property; this meant 
that the compensation award would be offset by the value of all benefits 
that accrued to the Karans’ property, instead of just the “special 
benefits.” The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s deci-
sion in favor of the Karans and sided with the state, ordering the lower 
measure of compensation.71 It remains to be seen whether New Jersey’s 
approach will be adopted elsewhere in the United States. 
The New Jersey approach can potentially make application of the 
offset rule much easier. Applying this approach, one measures the value 
of a partially taken property before the taking and after it.72 The differ-
ence between the two values is the amount that has to be paid in 
compensation. If the remainder of the land has actually increased in 
value after the taking, no compensation need be paid at all.73 Of course, 
even this approach may pose logistical problems. It’s doubtful that the 
affected realty was actually sold immediately before and after the taking, 
making it more difficult to gauge the exact value of the property. Markets 
for real estate never involve perfect substitutes, so measuring price is a 
complex process.74 In addition, one has to account for other factors that 
                                                                                                                           
 67. 70 A.3d 524, 526–27 (N.J. 2013). 
 68. Id. at 527. 
 69. Id. at 528. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 526–27. 
 72. To be sure, this is not as easy as it sounds. The land market is not like the stock market. 
Thousands or even millions of identical stocks are bought and sold nearly continuously, such 
that it is possible to measure the price of a share at any given time with a high degree of 
precision. Land markets are much thinner—as there are many fewer buyers and sellers—and 
the products being sold are never perfect substitutes. Cf. William Larson, Bureau of Econ. 
Analysis, New Estimates of Value of Land of the United States 2 (Apr. 3, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/new-estimates-of-value-of-land-of-the-united-
states-larson.pdf [http://perma.cc/8727-U858] (discussing the difficulty of measuring the value 
of land and proposing a model for evaluating the value of land). 
 73. But see Brittany Harrison, Note, The Compensation Conundrum in Partial Takings 
Cases and the Consequences of Borough of Harvey Cedars, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 31, 
51–56, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/HARRISON.36.denovo.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9FAG-DNTZ] (arguing the New Jersey ruling is equally compatible with 
different valuation approaches). 
 74. See Peter Chinloy, Real Estate: Investment and Financial Strategy 25–47 (1988) 
(describing various approaches to appraising property, such as the cost, market, income-
capitalization, and hedonic approaches); Riël Franzsen & William J. McCluskey, Value-
Based Approaches to Property Taxation, in A Primer on Property Tax: Administration and 
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affect the price of the property, as reflected in broader price movements 
in the real estate market.75 
Problems in measuring offsets are compounded by the peculiar 
definition of “partial takings” for purposes of the offset doctrine. In most 
jurisdictions, a taking is considered “partial” for purposes of the offset 
doctrine so long as a portion of the owner’s land holdings is taken, even 
if all the taken land consists of whole parcels.76 Consider, for instance, a 
state decision to take a single parcel of land—Blackacre—in its entirety 
to create a park. The park is sufficiently valuable that the four abutting 
parcels of land—Whiteacre, Greyacre, Blueacre, and Greenacre—will all 
double in value. For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that all five parcels 
are of equal value, and all are worth $100,000. If each of the five parcels 
were owned by a different person, the state would have to pay $100,000 
in compensation to the owner of Blackacre to seize the land for the park. 
However, if the owner of Blackacre also owned another parcel, say 
Greyacre, the offset doctrine would view Blackacre–Greyacre as a single 
parcel that had been partially taken. Thus, under the offset doctrine, 
there would be no compensation: The $100,000 loss of Blackacre would 
be offset by the $100,000 gain in value of Greyacre. 
As our hypothetical taking of Blackacre illustrates, the offset 
doctrine leads to two disturbing anomalies. First, the amount of compen-
sation that must be paid for takings depends on the identity of the 
aggrieved party, rather than on the property being taken. The 
government’s taking of the same land, which is otherwise the same in all 
particulars, in some cases will require a large compensation payment and 
in others a small payment (or none at all) based on the identity of the 
owner. Second, the ability of the government to recapture the value of its 
givings depends on it taking property. If the government creates the park 
on land it already owns, it cannot utilize the offset doctrine, but if it 
seizes the land to create the park, the offset doctrine may be used to sub-
sidize the seizure. This means that the government best preserves its 
reservoir of land holdings by pairing its takings of land with projects that 
                                                                                                                           
Policy 41, 54–56 (William J. McCluskey, Gary C. Cornia & Lawrence C. Walters, eds., 2013) 
(describing the complexities of valuation in general and specific difficulties arising from 
the fact that “no two parcels are exactly alike”). 
 75. See Chinloy, supra note 74, at 27 (“Some problems with appraisal are posed by 
inflation and its presence or absence . . . .”). 
 76. A similar rule is applied to partial regulatory takings. A regulation that deprives 
some parcels of all their value, but leaves value in other parcels of the same owner, cannot 
be considered a regulation that completely eliminates the value of a parcel, automatically 
triggering a finding of a regulatory taking. Rather, such a regulation must be considered as 
depriving all the parcels together of some of their value, thus requiring an indeterminate 
and fact-intensive determination of whether the regulation went “too far” and became a 
regulatory taking. See infra notes 183–196. See generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 630–32 (2001) (noting the persistent difficulty of the denominator problem but 
rejecting the petitioner’s assertion of total deprivation to a smaller parcel because the 
issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari). 
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create positive externalities for landholders. For government planners 
with an eye on the budget, a project with such positive externalities is an 
excellent opportunity to take land on the cheap, as long as the govern-
ment remembers to take the land from holders of multiple parcels. 
This leads us to the third and most serious problem with offsets: No 
matter how perfectly the offsets are measured, they distort the incentives 
of state officials making decisions about takings. Indeed, in some sense, 
the more accurately the offset doctrine measures the effects of the tak-
ing, the worse the distortion of incentives. 
Ordinarily, when the government takes property by eminent domain, 
it owes compensation for the full value of the property taken, irrespective 
of any benefits created.77 But if the offset rule applies, the amount of 
compensation that must be paid drops drastically. Suddenly, the govern-
ment may force the private citizen to pay a charge for the “giving”—the 
benefit it bestows upon the citizen.78 This means that the government will 
pay less compensation and perhaps avoid having to pay at all. When the 
offset rule applies, takings are dramatically cheaper for the government. 
All things being equal, the government should always prefer takings in 
which the offset rule applies to those in which it does not. 
The offset rule may lead the government to configure projects in 
such a way as to take advantage of the ability to reduce compensation by 
offsetting gains. This creates an incentive for the government to prefer, 
all things being equal, to seize parts of two parcels rather than one com-
plete parcel. Likewise, the doctrine incentivizes the government to take 
parcels from owners of multiple parcels, rather than to take all the 
landholdings of a single owner. 
2. Severance. — A second unique doctrine associated with partial tak-
ings is the severance damage rule.79 Under this rule, when an asset is 
partially taken, the compensation is calculated in two steps. First, one 
calculates the value of the partial asset taken. Second, one measures the 
change in value of the partial asset that remains with the owner—the 
“severance damage.” One then combines the two values to get the total 
amount of compensation.80 
The severance rule is not generally intended to be applied together 
with an offset rule. Rather, it is used as a different approach to calculat-
                                                                                                                           
 77. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.02(1) (noting “just 
compensation” has generally been interpreted to mean “fair and adequate monetary 
compensation for land actually taken, regardless of any benefits to the remainder”); see 
also Noel F. Delporte, Note, Benefit as Legal Compensation for the Taking of Property 
Under Eminent Domain, 16 St. Louis L. Rev. 313, 317–23 (1931) (discussing state 
constitutional provisions that forbid using benefits to offset compensation for land 
takings). 
 78. See Fischel, supra note 42, at 80–84; Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 49, 
at 555–56, 596–97. 
 79. See 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 281 (2014). 
 80. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.02(1). 
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ing damages. To understand this, consider the ordinary use of the offset 
rule. The offset rule is used when the primary measure of damages is the 
difference between the value of the whole asset before the taking and the 
partially remaining property after the taking.81 In such cases, the offset 
rule clarifies that that difference in value is not the final word on 
compensation due; rather, the loss in value occasioned by the taking 
must be “offset” by certain benefits. By contrast, when the severance rule 
is used, the primary measure of damages is the value of that portion of 
the asset which is taken. Ideally, measuring damages by the value of taken 
land plus severance damages should yield the same result as measuring 
the value of the remaining land discounted by general benefits. The 
severance rule simply assures that proper account is taken of the impact 
of the taking on the remaining property. As the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted, the different approaches (offset or severance) ultimately 
seek to measure the same loss, but do so in different ways. Consequently, 
setting compensation at the difference between property value before 
and after taking (of the untaken parts of the asset) and then adding 
extra compensation for “severance” can result in the payment of double 
compensation.82 Said the court, 
[A]s the government argues, if th[e] [“before and after method 
of valuation”] is properly employed when there is a partial 
taking, severance damages should not be allowed. This is so 
because if the fair market value of the property after the taking 
is subtracted from its fair market value before the taking, pre-
sumably the fair market value after the taking would reflect any 
diminution in value by reason of the taking so that a separate 
allowance for severance damages is unnecessary in order for the 
landowner to recover just compensation.83 
Theoretically, the severance rule should allow courts to avoid the 
pitfalls of the offset rule and calculate damages more precisely. Unfor-
tunately, reality is more complicated.84 Severance damages are almost 
impossible to calculate. Measuring severance damages requires courts to 
undertake the same task that frustrates them in measuring offsets: They 
must figure out to what degree changes in asset value are attributable to 
“severance” as opposed to other phenomena,85 such as changes in the 
                                                                                                                           
 81. See supra section I.B.1; see also 1 Lewis Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of 
Eminent Domain §§ 48–51 (James C. Bonbright ed., 2d ed. 1953) (comparing the three 
formulas courts have used to measure “just compensation” for partial takings). 
 82. See United States v. 2.33 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 728, 728 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 83. Id. at 730 (citing United States v. 38.60 Acres of Land, 625 F.2d 196, 201 (8th Cir. 
1980)). 
 84. See Ashley Mas, Note, Eminent Domain Law and “Just” Compensation for 
Diminution of Access, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 369, 374–75 & n.31 (2014) (listing the 
exceptions to the principle that all consequential damage to remaining parcels is 
compensable). 
 85. See 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 1, § 14.03 (addressing limitations 
on the compensability of damage to remaining property). 
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market or the general effects of a government action. Because the mar-
kets for partial assets are often thin, or even nonexistent, there is little 
empirical basis on which courts can make such determinations. Instead 
courts must try to infer the relative financial impact of several causes by 
various indirect measurements. 
Additionally, even if courts feel confident enough to make a decision 
about the economic impact of a severance, they must have a firm grasp of 
the other pieces of the compensation puzzle. They must be able to 
measure the value of the taken asset in such a way as to ensure full com-
pensation but not double compensation.86 
It is little wonder, therefore, that courts often choose the offset method 
instead. 
C. The Problem with Partial Takings 
While partial takings are both ubiquitous and necessary, they also 
raise unique economic problems. Specifically, partial takings lead to 
three characteristic difficulties. First, the division of a parcel between 
state and owner creates a situation that may be prone to strategic misbe-
havior, such as extortion by the state. Second, in dividing parcels between 
the state and the prior owner, partial takings may create new assets (post-
taking parcels) that are suboptimally configured. For instance, while a 
partial taking may enable a road, the partial taking may come at the price 
of making an entire farm unusable. Third, because partial takings involve 
dividing up existing parcels of land, they create new assets that may have 
no clear market. This complicates efforts to value the asset taken. 
Obviously, all three of these difficulties are related to one another. 
The special doctrines discussed above do not fully address these 
three problems, and in some ways, they even exacerbate them. Indeed, 
the offset doctrine in particular creates a fourth problem with partial tak-
ings: Special doctrines incentivize the state to prefer partial takings over 
complete takings.87 Indeed, the state may choose inefficient partial 
takings over efficient complete takings or nonaction. 
In this section we address each of these problems, in reverse order. 
We begin with the artificial and undesirable incentive to engage in partial 
takings created by the special doctrines. 
1. The Artificial Incentive for Partial Takings. — The first problem that 
arises in the context of partial takings is directly related to the offset rule. As 
explained above, the offset rule allows the government to adjust downward 
compensation awards by taking account of the positive effects of exercises 
of eminent domain.88 The offset rule, however, applies only to partial 
takings or takings of a portion of an owner’s larger set of holdings. When 
                                                                                                                           
 86. See id. § 14.02(3)(b)(ii). 
 87. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 88. See supra section I.B.1. 
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land holdings are taken in their entirety, no offset is possible. This, of 
course, creates an incentive for the government to prefer partial takings 
to total takings when both methods can achieve the government’s goals.89 
As an illustration, consider the following example. Imagine that the 
construction of a new highway exit increases the value of ten identical 
contiguous commercial lots by 200% each on account of the increase in 
the volume of traffic. Assume that the government can construct the new 
exit either by taking four of the lots in their entirety or by taking 40% of 
each of the ten lots. Assume, further, that the first option—taking four 
lots in their entirety—is more desirable from a planning standpoint; seiz-
ing the lots in their entirety would allow for a more compact exit, with 
lower maintenance costs and superior safety. In the absence of the offset 
rule, the government would clearly prefer to take the four entire lots. 
This option would lead to better results at the same cost (or perhaps even 
a lower cost, since the government would bear the administrative cost of 
only four takings, rather than ten). Yet, under the current compensation 
rules, the government has a strong financial incentive to choose the 
second, inferior option. While the inferior option would require the gov-
ernment to bear the cost of prosecuting ten eminent domain proceedings, 
in each case, thanks to the offset rule, the government would avoid paying 
any compensation. The offset rule, in other words, would render the 
acquisition of private property by eminent domain essentially free, so long 
as the government remembered to use partial takings. 
In the extreme case, partial takings allow the state to take fee simple 
ownership in land without paying compensation and without falling 
afoul of the constitutional requirement to pay “just compensation” for 
takings. But even in the less extreme cases in which the state does have to 
pay compensation for a partial taking, the offset rule makes it likely that 
the state will pay less than it would for similar assets taken by whole-
parcel takings. 
Naturally, the ability to seize ownership for no compensation or for 
very little compensation distorts the government’s decisions on takings. 
Simply put, when given the opportunity to take a lot and pay a little, 
there are few who will resist to the opportunity to take.90 
2. Compensation Problems. — Of course, the purpose of the offset rule 
is not to distort government incentives. Rather, the offset rule (like the 
severance rule) helps courts properly calculate compensation for partial 
takings.91 
                                                                                                                           
 89. See supra section I.B. 
 90. One does not need to hold to extreme versions of fiscal illusion to recognize that 
budgetary considerations potentially impact government decisionmaking in some fashion. 
See supra note 38. 
 91. See 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 1, § 14.02[1] (noting that the 
severance and offset rules “are merely tools to be used by the court or the jury in 
determining the sometimes elusive question of what constitutes full or just compensation 
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As we noted, compensation for eminent domain is already a difficult 
task even when the taking is of a complete parcel. Compensation, as cal-
culated by standard doctrines, ignores a number of important harms and 
benefits.92 The offset doctrine partially alleviates the failure to take 
account of givings in ordinary exercises of eminent domain, but it does 
so at the cost of distorting government incentives.93 Additionally, when 
the offset doctrine discounts general benefits, it forces courts to engage 
in a fact-intensive inquiry into the character of different benefits 
remainder properties enjoy.94 
Partial takings do not alleviate the ordinary difficulties in calculating 
compensation; they exacerbate them. This is because partial takings 
necessarily divide assets into new configurations. The old configurations 
may have had thick or thin markets, but the new configuration will 
almost certainly have a thin market or none at all. Consider, for example, 
the taking of a diagonal strip of land for a road, in such a manner as to 
create two remainder parcels that are roughly triangular. Though the 
new triangular parcels might have been created previously, they were not, 
probably because there was little demand for them. While the demand 
for such parcels might emerge at some time in the future, there is little 
likelihood that such demand will emerge precisely at the time they are 
created by the partial taking.95 
                                                                                                                           
in the case of partial taking”); see also Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp., 365 A.2d 
469, 472 (N.J. 1976) (providing the formulas for the offset and severance methods and 
noting that either may be used in New Jersey); Orgel, supra note 81, §§ 48–51 (noting the 
three formulas courts use to determine partial takings compensation). 
 92. See Coniston Corp. v. Vilage of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 
1988) (“Compensation in the constitutional sense is . . . not full compensation, for market 
value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the 
value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”); see also Bell & Parchomovsky, 
Taking Compensation Private, supra note 40, at 885–90; Durham, supra note 40, at 1278–
79; Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 962–67 
[hereinafter Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart]; Krier & Serkin, supra note 40, at 
866; Merrill, supra note 40, at 82–85. In practice, “Many owners are ‘intramarginal,’ 
meaning that because of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special 
suitability of the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value 
their property at more than its market value.” Coniston, 844 F.2d at 472. 
 93. See, e.g., Russo, supra note 23, at 1552 (noting that as nineteenth-century 
railroad companies “invested with the power of eminent domain [and] took advantage of 
the ability to offset, some began to compensate landowners entirely in benefits,” with 
“[o]ne scholar report[ing] that railroad takings in Illinois frequently resulted in an award 
of $1” (footnote omitted)); cf. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.03(1) 
(noting that offset rules vary depending “on whether benefits may setoff damages to the 
remainder or to the property taken and whether special or general benefits may be 
considered for setoff”). 
 94. Russo, supra note 23, at 1552. (“The early nineteenth century opinions made no 
effort to classify benefits as general or special, and the New York high court went so far as 
to suggest that a landowner could be entirely compensated with benefits.”). 
 95. Studies show that parcels with regular boundaries are more valuable than those 
with irregular boundaries. See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of 
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To arrive at the correct compensation amount, judges must be able 
to estimate the value of the giving received by the affected property 
owners, the potential effects of future use by the government, and the 
suitability of the remainder for standard uses. In addition, the judge 
ought to be able to determine the harm the severance causes in those 
cases in which such harm exists. This is a formidable task. 
As one would expect, there could be significant disagreement 
between the government and the private property owners concerning the 
appropriate compensation amount. Naturally, each party would attempt 
to bolster its claims by hiring the services of land appraisers, and the 
court would often be presented with divergent opinions as to what it 
should do. At the end of the day, though, notwithstanding the court’s 
best efforts and the amounts the parties expend, it is unrealistic to expect 
the court to arrive at an accurate number. As a result, the amount 
awarded may be excessive or undercompensatory,96 and the costs parties 
incur simply in order to figure out how to allocate the value and loss of 
the taking largely represent a pure loss from a social perspective. 
3. Problematic Asset Configurations. — Even if the government could 
figure out how to calculate compensation easily, partial takings would still 
be problematic. Partial takings, by their nature, reconfigure assets. Part 
of an asset is taken by the government and part is left behind, creating 
two new smaller assets in place of the one larger one. But these new 
assets may not be properly configured for optimal use. Naturally, the 
asset held by the government is in a configuration that the government 
deems suitable for its use. But the part left in the hands of the private 
owners in the aftermath of partial takings is often unsuitable for its pre-
taking use.97 At times, the remaining part is unfit for any economically 
viable use. 
This is especially true when the government takes a large percentage 
of the original parcel. For instance, takings of over 50% of the original 
parcel may result in the creation of remainders of very little use for their 
owners. Naturally, the specific effect will also depend on the initial size of 
the parcel that was subject to a partial taking. Very large parcels may 
“survive” substantial partial takings without losing the lion’s share of 
their value, whereas small parcels may see their value eviscerated even by 
relatively small partial takings. 
                                                                                                                           
Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. Pol. Econ. 426, 446–50 
(2011); Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in Research 
Handbook on the Economics of Property Law 257, 279–92 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. 
Smith eds., 2011). 
 96. Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 473, 
487–88 (1976) (finding pervasive under- and overcompensation in eminent domain cases 
in Illinois). 
 97. For examples, see generally Richard E. Welch, Valueless Property: How a 
Remainder Converts to a Remnant, Right Way Mag., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 36, 36–37. 
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Another factor that affects the suitability of the remainder for future 
use is the pertinent land use law. Specifically, minimum lot size and set-
back requirements can render the remaining parts unsuitable for 
residential and commercial uses, dooming them to lie fallow if the 
owners cannot secure a change in the zoning rules or an exemption. 
Small size is not the only problem resulting from partial takings. 
Partial takings may also create irregular-sized lots. The taking of a corner 
of a lot for a park may create an “L”-shaped remainder lot, for example. 
In other cases, partial takings may leave only a narrow sliver of the origi-
nal lot, leading to the formation of “bowling alley” parcels. Needless to 
say, such unorthodox configurations make the remaining parts almost 
entirely unfit for conventional uses. 
In a smoothly functioning market among willing buyers and sellers, 
these kinds of asset configurations would not be of concern. Owners 
would voluntarily subject their assets to such troublesome reconfigura-
tions only if the newly enabled use were valuable enough to compensate 
for the loss engendered by stunting the ability of the remaining parcel to 
produce value. But exercises of eminent domain are not market 
transactions; indeed, it is highly unlikely that the power of eminent 
domain would be used if there were a smoothly functioning market in 
which the government could buy the lots it needed.98 There is no guar-
antee that the partial taking is valuable enough to justify stunting the 
remaining parcel. Indeed, there is no guarantee that the stunting was 
necessary to achieve the purpose of the taking; perhaps the new use of 
the taken property could be best achieved by using whole parcels, rather 
than partially taken parcels. 
4. Strategic Misbehavior. — A final problem emanating from partial 
takings is that they may induce strategic misbehavior on the part of the 
government. The potential for strategic misbehavior is in large part the 
result of the problems described above. 
Consider again the differences between the compensation doctrine 
applicable to partial and complete takings. The government can greatly 
reduce the amount of compensation it will pay by carrying out a partial 
rather than complete taking. But the government need not actually carry 
out the partial taking. The threat of a partial taking can be employed in 
order to convince owners to take less compensation.99 
The possibility of strategic misbehavior does not end at the moment 
of the partial taking. Oftentimes, the nature of the asset divided by the 
partial taking is such that the newly divided assets continue to be strongly 
linked. If Blackacre, a farm, is partially taken by the government, what 
                                                                                                                           
 98. Even with the shortcomings in compensation for takings, the process of taking 
property by eminent domain is costly, and likely more costly than negotiations in a 
smoothly functioning market. 
 99. See Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 
48 Notre Dame Law. 765, 788–89 (1973). 
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remains of Blackacre will be highly influenced by a government decision 
to use its part as a waste facility, rather than a park. More generally, once 
it has taken the asset part it needed and has paid compensation for it, the 
government can threaten to use the taken part in ways that impose nega-
tive externalities on the owner of the remainder. Once again, the threat 
can be employed to extract payment from owners (or, more likely, to 
silence objections by the owners to other government actions).100 
Consider the construction of a new highway. To enable the project, 
the government must take several lots, in whole or in part. Thereafter, in 
the event of partial takings, multiple remainders of various sizes will 
remain in the hands of the original owners. Having paid compensation 
to the owners, the government has discharged its legal duty. But, of 
course, the payment of compensation does not terminate the relation-
ship between the government and the owners of the taken property. 
Subsequent to the takings, the government must decide what resources 
to expend on the maintenance of the new highway. For example, the 
government must decide whether to erect acoustic barriers between the 
highway and the lots, how much to spend on upkeep and maintenance, 
and how to develop the landscape. These and other decisions will have a 
direct bearing on the value of the remainders.101 
To be sure, similar strategic problems may arise in any case of 
eminent domain. The government may threaten eminent domain in 
order to extract favors. Or, once it has taken the property, the state may 
threaten to use it in ways that are disadvantageous to owners of adjacent 
lots. However, the strategic problem is particularly acute in the case of 
partial takings. Partial takings, and the attendant compensation doc-
trines, give the government a number of tools for extortion. In some 
cases, these tools may end up being used. 
II. ADDING OPTIONS TO PARTIAL TAKINGS 
In this Part, we suggest a new approach to partial takings that would 
vest a put option in private property owners whenever the government 
elects to engage in a partial taking. The creation of a put option would 
bestow upon the private property owner the power to sell the remainder 
of her partially taken asset to the government at a percentage of fair 
market value of the asset as a whole at the time of the partial taking. 
                                                                                                                           
 100. A related phenomenon is the strategic announcement of takings in order to take 
advantage of “condemnation blight” and lower compensation amounts. See 8A Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, supra note 44, § G18.02; Kanner, supra note 99, at 769; cf. T. Nicolaus 
Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, Fair and Efficient Compensation for Taking Property 
Under Uncertainty, 7 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 471, 474 (2005) (arguing such announcements 
reduce property values and should require compensation). 
 101. Kanner, supra note 99, at 786–87 (discussing the need to indemnify condemnees 
for damages). 
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Formalization of this new entitlement would create a property 
arrangement in which the parcel is divided (as the government desires in 
effecting a partial taking), but either party can exercise the legal power 
to effect a unification of the title in the hands of the government. As 
Professor Ian Ayres has pointed out, the government already holds a call 
option on all private property by dint of its power of eminent domain.102 
The power of eminent domain entitles the government to seize title to 
any property, or part thereof, provided that it acts in the furtherance of a 
public use and is willing to pay the private owner just compensation, 
measured by fair market value.103 This proposal is intended to pair the 
government’s broad call option with a much more limited put option 
that would be conferred on private property owners in cases of partial 
takings. 
As is true of all options, private property owners would be under no 
obligation to exercise their new legal entitlement. They would be free to 
do so at their discretion. Importantly, the introduction of a put option 
would result in a property arrangement that has the potential to amelio-
rate significantly all the problems associated with partial takings. The put 
option would encourage the reunification of assets with respect to which 
partial takings result in inefficient configurations. It would also create 
strategic pressures on the owner to reach a more realistic assessment of 
the value of the taking, while reducing the ability of the government to 
engage in strategic misbehavior. If coupled with the elimination or 
reform of the offset doctrine, this property arrangement would neutral-
ize all the difficulties mentioned in the previous Part. 
In order to explain our proposal, we begin with a brief review of the 
intersection of the rich literature on options with the phenomenon of 
takings. We then present the particulars of our proposed approach to 
partial takings. 
A. The Use of Options in Property Law 
The pertinent options come in two varieties. The first, a call option, 
allows the option holder to purchase an asset, entitlement, or future 
commodity from a certain counterparty at a preagreed price or at a price 
to be determined in the future.104 The second type, a put option, can be 
thought of as the mirror image of a call option: It empowers the option 
holder to sell a good, entitlement, or future commodity to a certain 
counterparty at a preset price or a price to be decided in the future.105 
                                                                                                                           
 102. See Ayres, Protecting Property, supra note 8, at 809 n.47. 
 103. See U.S. Const. amend. V; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1943) 
(noting the courts’ adoption of “fair market value” as a measure of “just compensation”). 
 104. Ayres, Protecting Property, supra note 8, at 796. 
 105. Id. 
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Options are often used to incentivize or suppress certain behaviors,106 
align the interests of the parties,107 or to force parties to provide infor-
mation.108 Options may also be used to effect a better ownership 
structure or configuration of assets.109 It is this use of options that is 
especially pertinent for our purposes. 
In recent years, scholars have used option theory to devise 
innovative solutions to various property problems. This line of analysis 
begins with Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s seminal insight that 
all legal entitlements may be divided into three prototypes.110 The first 
prototype, property rule protection, vests in the entitlement holder the 
power to set the price for takings or uses of her entitlement, and any 
attempts to take the entitlement nonconsensually will be met with an 
injunction.111 The second prototype, liability rule protection, bestows the 
price-setting power not on the entitlement holder but rather on some 
third party, such as a legislator, court, or administrative agency, which 
means that transgressions will be met with a damages award that may fall 
way short of the asking price of the entitlement holder.112 Finally, the 
third prototype, inalienability rules, puts the entitlement outside the 
sphere of market transactions and forbids the entitlement holder to sell 
her entitlement to others even for a price of her choosing.113 
                                                                                                                           
 106. See Ian Ayres, The Bill of Options?, in Optional Law: The Structure of Legal 
Entitlements 1, 8 (2005) [hereinafter Ayres, The Bill of Options?]; Madeline Morris, The 
Structure of Entitlements, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 822, 824 (1993); see also Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang, The Green Option, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 967, 997 (2015) 
(explaining how call options can be used to incentivize large businesses to act in a more 
environmentally responsible way). 
 107. See, e.g., John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal 
Equity Incentive Levels, 28 J. Acct. & Econ. 151, 152 (1999) (“[F]irms actively manage 
grants of new equity incentives to CEOs in response to deviations from an optimal level of 
equity incentives.”); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate 
Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155, 1174–75 (1985) (explaining 
that shareholder choice to broaden ownership can enhance profits); Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 336 (1976) (arguing option contracts can be 
used to align managerial and shareholder incentives and maximize firm value). 
 108. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399, 1404 
(2005) (discussing how options may be employed to reveal private information); Saul 
Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 771, 779 
(1982) (explaining how the grant of call options to third parties may induce truthful 
reporting of property values for property tax purposes). 
 109. See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 806 (N.Y. 
1996) (explaining that “options ‘appendant’ or ‘appurtenant’ to leases—encourage the 
possessory holder to invest in maintaining and developing the property by guaranteeing 
the option holder the ultimate benefit of any such investment”). 
 110. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 30, at 1092. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1092–93. 
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Drawing on the Calabresi-Melamedean framework, property theorists 
have analogized liability rule protection to call options.114 As an illustra-
tion, consider a classic pollution dispute. Assume a factory that emits 
smoke, depositing soot on a residential lot. Assume further that the law 
wishes to protect the entitlement of the resident to fresh air, free of 
pollutants. In this case, the law can either grant the resident property 
rule protection or liability rule protection. Under a property rule, the 
residential property owner will have an absolute right to block the 
emissions and win an injunction in court against the factory continuing 
to emit smoke. A liability rule, on the other hand, will allow the court to 
set the price of the pollution; the resident will win money damages to 
compensate her for the harm she suffers, but the factory will continue to 
emit smoke and soot. 
Professor Carol Rose colorfully explained the policy choice in the 
following way: 
[Under a property rule regime], the entitlement holder has the 
whole meatball, so to speak, and the other party has nothing—
one has property, the other has zip. Under either of the two 
liability rules, on the other hand, the meatball gets split: The 
factory has an option to pollute (or once exercised, an 
easement), while the homeowner has a property right subject to 
an option (or easement).115 
The value of employing options in property law has not escaped other 
property theorists. Even Professor Richard Epstein, generally a champion 
of strong property rule protection for property interests,116 has acknowl-
edged the value of employing call options with respect to property in 
some cases. Specifically, Epstein has written of the utility of liability rules 
as a means of overcoming holdout problems and cases of bilateral 
monopoly that thwart voluntary exchange, noting that “liability rules, 
when used, always take the direction of a ‘call’ [option].”117 
Ayres took the next logical step by suggesting the potential utility of 
put options as well. Ayres illustrated his analysis within the common 
framework of a pollution lawsuit. To begin with, Ayres explained the 
creation of options as a two-step process.118 In step one, a party takes or 
compromises the property interest of another, as in the case of the 
                                                                                                                           
 114. See e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 Yale L.J. 703, 729–33 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, 
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale 
L.J. 1027, 1041–46 (1995). 
 115. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2178–79 (1997). 
 116. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of 
Property Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2120 (1997) (“The choice between property rules and 
liability rules should normally be resolved in favor of the former . . . .”). 
 117. Id. at 2093. 
 118. Ayres, Protecting Property, supra note 8, at 800. 
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factory that emits pollutants onto a neighboring lot.119 Once the initial 
partial taking occurs, an option is created if a court decides to grant the 
affected property owner liability rule protection. By setting an amount of 
damages to be paid by the taker, the court effectively gives the taker a 
choice between exercising the option at the price set by the court and 
thereby appropriating the underlying entitlement or refraining from 
exercising the option at said price by stopping and restoring the status 
quo ante. 
Extending the analysis to puts, Ayres noted that after the initial 
transgression occurs, courts have another option at their disposal: They 
can empower the harmed property owner to sell her interest to the 
transgressor at the price set by the court.120 Ayres explained that the use 
of put options has different distributional and informational effects than 
the use of calls. Puts place the decisionmaking power in the hands of the 
harmed party, as opposed to the aggressor, allowing her to perform the 
relevant cost-benefit analysis and to exercise the option only when doing 
so inures to her benefit.121 
As an example of the use of options in current property doctrine, 
Ayres turned to the doctrine of encroachment. An encroachment occurs 
when a land owner erects a structure that projects into or fully stands on 
her neighbor’s property.122 Traditionally, the common law dealt with 
encroachment by granting property rule protection to the encroached-
upon party and issuing an injunction against the encroacher even when 
the encroachment happened in good faith.123 The case of Pile v. Pedrick124 
provides a powerful, albeit extreme, illustration. There, the foundations 
of the defendant’s factory wall projected by one-and-three-eighths inches 
onto the plaintiff’s property.125 The encroachment resulted from a 
surveyor’s error of which the defendant was not aware.126 Despite the fact 
that the encroachment was both de minimis and in good faith, the court 
ordered the defendant to remove the offending portion of the wall.127 As 
                                                                                                                           
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 804–13 (discussing the distributional, informational, and bid–ask spread of 
puts). 
 122. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property 40 (2d ed. 2005). 
 123. See, e.g., James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional 
Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 134 (1993) (noting 
that “[u]nder the common law of the early nineteenth century . . . when an owner 
vindicated his title to the land by ejecting the improver from possession, his title was held 
to encompass title to the improvements”); Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 657, 669 (2014) (“Under the conventional common law view, the 
mistaken improver of land was not entitled to any compensation from the landowner for 
the improvement.”). 
 124. 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895). 
 125. Id. at 647. 
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the plaintiff was not willing to sell the tiny bit of land to the defendant, 
nor to permit the defendant entry to chip away the small portion of the 
offending foundations, the defendant had no choice but to remove the 
wall in its entirety.128 
Over time, the law has shifted away from the dogmatic approach of 
the common law. A growing number of states have modified the traditional 
approach statutorily by empowering courts to use liability rule protection 
in cases of good-faith encroachments, in which the encroacher did not 
know and was not supposed to know that she encroached on her 
neighbor’s land and in which the value of the encroaching structure far 
exceeds the value of the underlying land.129 In such cases, certain states 
vest power in the courts to give the encroacher an option to buy the 
affected land strip from the victim at a price the court sets—a call option 
solution.130 Other states have gone even further by recognizing an option 
in good-faith encroachers to force a sale of the structure upon the 
encroached-upon neighbor—a put option solution.131 
The modern approach to encroachments provides a natural launch-
ing pad for our proposed reform of the doctrine of partial takings. After 
all, encroachments that are authorized without the consent of the owner 
are nothing more (or less) than partial private takings.132 
We propose an expansion of the number of options already created 
in the context of partial takings. In addition to the options already 
inherent in the nature of the taking, we suggest adding a new put option, 
as we will describe in greater detail in the next section. The option we 
propose provides a simple but elegant way to ameliorate the harsh results 
of property rules without excessively disturbing the overall structure of 
entitlements. 
B. An Option-Based Mechanism for Addressing Partial Takings 
In this section, we propose an options mechanism that should 
accompany all partial takings. The aim of the mechanism is simul-
taneously to alleviate the central weakness of partial takings—the danger 
that partial takings might result in suboptimal partitions of parcels or 
titles that adversely affect land value—and to ameliorate or avoid the 
appraisal problems that plague partial takings. The options mechanism 
we propose addresses the former issue by giving the private owner the 
ability to reunify an affected parcel at a price that is partially predeter-
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 129. See, e.g., Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 
37, 42 n.28 (1985) (reporting that at least forty-two states have adopted versions of such acts). 
 130. Id. at 65–68. 
 131. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 871.1–.7 (West 2015). 
 132. See generally Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 517, 519 (2009) 
(arguing “takings carried out by non-governmental actors . . . have long existed, in some 
form or another, in our legal system”). 
2017] PARTIAL TAKINGS 2073 
 
mined. By linking the price of unification to compensation for the partial 
taking, our mechanism also incentivizes parties to provide information 
that eases the task of determining the correct compensation for the 
initial partial taking. 
In our proposal, every partial taking would be accompanied by the 
creation of a put option that complements the call option the govern-
ment already has. The put option of private property owners would arise 
immediately upon the announcement of a partial taking and would have 
to be exercised within a short time—we propose three months. The price 
of exercising the option—the “strike price”—would be set by two factors: 
the market values set at the time of the partial taking and a ratio 
specified by the court at the time of the partial taking. The ratio, in turn, 
would be set by the court on the basis of the market prices of the asset as 
a whole and the portion taken. 
To illustrate how our proposal would work, consider the following 
example. Assume that the government announces a plan to take a por-
tion of Beth’s parcel in order to add another lane to an interstate 
highway. Ordinarily, the court would examine the value of Beth’s parcel 
and the portion taken thereof, announce a compensation award for the 
partial taking, and grant the government title for the portion. Under our 
proposal, the court’s order would be slightly more detailed. The court 
would not only announce the value of the portion taken, but it would 
also announce the value of Beth’s parcel as a whole. For purposes of illus-
tration, let us imagine that Beth’s parcel is appraised at $500,000 and the 
portion taken is appraised at $100,000. This would mean that the court 
found that the portion taken was worth 20% of the whole parcel. As in an 
ordinary taking, the government would pay $100,000 and receive title to 
the portion of Beth’s parcel it desires. 
At this point, a put option would be granted to Beth to force a sale 
of the remainder of her lot to the government. The option would allow 
Beth a three-month period during which she could force the government 
to buy the remainder of her parcel at a price equal to 80% of the value of 
the parcel as a whole, or $400,000. It is important to note that the formal-
ization of a put option in Beth creates symmetry between private 
property owners and the government. Indeed, as Ayres explained, the 
government, on account of its eminent domain power, already has a call 
option over all private property, with the exercise price being fair market 
value.133 In principle, therefore, had the government wanted, it could 
have seized the entirety of Beth’s parcel and paid her $500,000, invoking 
the same public use purpose that enabled the partial taking.134 
                                                                                                                           
 133. Ayres, The Bill of Options?, supra note 106, at 4. 
 134. While the government would have to show a “public use” for the remainder, 
under current law, the government can point to almost anything as a public use justifying 
the taking. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005) (“For more 
than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and 
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The central feature of our proposal is thus to give both sides the 
ability to force the unity of asset. The symmetric ability to force unity of 
the asset not only encourages maintaining asset unity when it is more 
valuable but also eliminates the strategic incentive to seize partial assets 
when it is possible to offload uncompensated costs on the remaining 
parcel. In essence, the options force the government to evaluate the costs 
of a partial taking that would otherwise fall on the owner. 
C. The Advantages of the Proposed Model 
Our proposal offers four advantages over the current legal regime. 
First, our proposal creates a readily available mechanism for reuniting 
the title to the lot as a whole in the hands of a single owner, thereby 
preempting the creation of negative externalities that tend to arise in 
cases of split ownership. Second, and relatedly, it prevents the creation of 
parcels that are suboptimally configured for use. Third, our mechanism 
creates an incentive for the government to engage in more efficient 
planning and land development policies. Fourth, our proposal may save 
costs, relative to the existing rule, by simplifying the appraisal of the 
value of the part that remains in the hands of the private owner after the 
taking. 
Let us examine each of these advantages in turn. 
1. Improved Asset Configuration. — The proposal’s ability to unify 
parcels is straightforward. Indeed, this is its central feature. Under our 
proposed regime, both government and owner have the ability to force 
reunification of a parcel split by a partial taking. This means that when 
one or the other of the parties believes the division to be suboptimal, 
either can force the unification. At the same time, the mechanism does 
not require the pretaking parcel configuration to remain forever. If the 
decision satisfies the parties, they can allow the options to lapse, and the 
parcels will have successfully been reconfigured. Thus, the proposal 
encourages unity only when one or the other party foresees a benefit 
from unity. It is only when a government taking threatens to leave the 
remainder unfit for use, or suboptimally configured for use, that the 
owner will exercise her put option to stop this result from occurring. 
While the owner would be unable to block the taking—that is the nature 
of eminent domain—the owner would be able to decide whether she is 
better off with the remaining partial parcel or the compensation. The 
government would not necessarily be saddled permanently with the 
remainder asset either. If the government could find a buyer for the 
remainder of the parcel, it could transfer the remainder to someone able 
to make productive use of it. 
2. More Accurate Compensation. — The ability to force unity of the 
parcel, together with the option to leave the partial taking in place, 
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2017] PARTIAL TAKINGS 2075 
 
points to our proposal’s second advantage. The reason an owner would 
choose to exercise the put option and force a taking of the remainder is 
either some flaw in the compensation scheme that ensures overcompen-
sation for the remainder or a flaw in the configuration of the remainder 
that makes it difficult to use or sell. While flaws in the compensation 
scheme are certainly possible (as we shall discuss momentarily), it is 
reasonable to conjecture that the bulk of cases exercising the put option 
will involve a flawed configuration of the remainder. Flaws in the 
compensation scheme can be rectified with cash payments, without 
passing title; transferring title can be costly and traumatic. The owner’s 
put option will likely be exercised only when the remainder cannot be 
put to more productive use. 
3. Incentivizing Improved Government Decisionmaking. — The third 
advantage of our proposal is its effect on government decisions. Strictly 
speaking, our proposal is not necessary for the government to have a call 
option on the remainder. Thanks to the government’s power of eminent 
domain, in all cases of partial takings, the government could have taken 
the remainder if it had so desired, and it can always pick up the remain-
der later.135 Accordingly, the decision to take only a part implies that, 
from the government’s perspective, a partial taking (coupled with partial 
compensation) is preferable to a complete taking (accompanied by full 
compensation). As we explained, the government’s cost-benefit calculus 
is not necessarily aligned with the preference of the property owner and 
does not necessarily reflect the broad societal interest.136 Yet, under 
current law, the government has the power to force its preference on the 
owner of the partially taken property, and the owner has no real say in 
the matter. 
The creation of a put option in the property owner, per our 
proposal, will change the balance of power between the government and 
private property owners. It would allow property owners, who wish to do 
so, to force a sale of the remainder of the lot to the government in cases 
of partial takings. The formalization of a put option that would comple-
ment the government’s already-existing call option will necessarily 
change the calculus the government performs when it considers whether 
to carry out a partial taking or a full taking. On the most basic level, it 
will force the government to take account of the cost that its choice will 
impose on property owners. Knowing that private property owners whose 
land was partially taken will be able to sell the remainder to the govern-
ment will induce the government to engage in more socially optimal 
partial takings and in appropriate cases take the whole lot ab initio. 
Relatedly, our proposal neutralizes some of the problematic incen-
tives current partial takings doctrine creates. As we noted, the offset 
doctrine creates a peculiar incentive for the government to seek partial 
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takings in place of total takings.137 It is only when the taking is considered 
“partial” that the government has the ability to reduce compensation 
awards by taking into account the positive effects of government projects 
on property values. Under our proposal, this perverse incentive is greatly 
diminished.138 Courts grant all partial takings compensation awards 
against the background of an assessment of the value of the parcel as a 
whole. While courts may still use the offset and severance doctrines to 
establish the value of the partial taking, such evaluations ultimately must 
be anchored by the value of a complete taking; if there is a significant 
enough divergence, one or the other of the parties will almost certainly 
exercise the put or call option to translate the partial taking into a com-
plete one. 
4. Reduced Administrative Costs. — The fourth and final advantage of 
our proposal can be found in the savings it produces in administrative 
and assessment costs. While our proposal leaves courts in the unenviable 
position of measuring the value of partially taken property, it holds out 
the possibility of cheaper and more accurate assessments of value. 
To begin with, the options significantly reduce the incentives for the 
parties to misstate the value of a partial taking. Prima facie, one may 
argue that our proposal invites the government to secure artificially low 
appraisals of the value of properties it plans to take. A second look shows 
this is not the case. It is under current doctrine that the government has 
an incentive to “depress” the value of taken properties, irrespective of 
whether it takes in whole or in part. Budgetary constraints invariably 
induce the government to try to lower the compensation amount it must 
pay to aggrieved property owners. Our proposal, however, greatly reduces 
the advantage of artificially low assessments of the value of the part of the 
property that is taken in partial takings. If the assessment of the portion 
taken is too low while the assessment of the property as a whole is 
roughly accurate, this will all but ensure that the property owner exer-
cises the put option. As for the danger of artificially low appraisals of the 
entire parcel, there is an easy and well-established fix. As is the case 
under current takings law, property owners have the right to challenge 
the government assessment and produce an appraisal of their own.139 
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Should the parties fail to reach an amicable resolution, a court will have 
to step in and determine the fair market value. In such cases, it will be 
only upon the issuance of a judicial determination that the property 
owner will get to exercise her put option. While there is no guarantee 
that appraisals of the value of the parcel as a whole will be accurate, as 
noted, there is reason to believe that such appraisals will be better than 
those of segments of the parcel with no clear market.140 
One might voice a concern over the fact that our proposal increases 
the cost of planning for the government. Under our proposal, whenever 
the government engages in a partial taking, it will have to bear in mind 
that the private owner might choose to exercise her put option, forcing 
the government to pay the full market value of the property, even though 
it needs only part of it. Although this argument is correct, it misses the 
mark. For while it is true that the total amount paid by the government 
will increase, so will the amount of land the government will have at its 
disposal. Importantly, the government will be able to use the land to its 
own ends or resell any parts in which it has no interest to third parties. In 
other words, the government will be able to use and dispose of the taken 
property as any private owner would. The only marginal cost our scheme 
imposes on the government consists of the transaction costs that the 
government will incur should it choose to transfer its title. It is critical to 
understand that, under current law, that same cost must be borne by the 
private property owner who wishes to sell her remainder. 
On a similar note, one might claim that the ultimate result of the 
exercise of put options by the owner will lead to excessive holdings of 
property by the state. Indeed, almost by definition, the put will force the 
state to take ownership of properties it did not express any interest in 
acquiring. Nonetheless, there is little reason to fear that this will ulti-
mately lead to excessive landholdings by the state. The state already has 
impressive powers to acquire property, including the right to purchase 
property and to take it by eminent domain. The state’s landholdings are 
vast—the federal government owns more than a quarter of all lands in 
the United States (considerably more in several states),141 and state and 
local governments also own vast amounts of land.142 At the same time, the 
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 140. Appraisals of the parcel in its entirety can rely upon valuation information from 
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 141. Carol Hardy Vincent et al., Cong. Research Serv., R42346, Federal Land 
Ownership: Overview and Data 6 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf 
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 142. See Nat. Res. Council of Me., Public Land Ownership by State 1–2, 
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also Nat’l Park Serv., Land Ownership in National Park System Units in Alaska and 
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state has the ability to sell property it does not desire, and it seems odd to 
fear that the state will end up holding too many lands because it has been 
forced to purchase lands it does not want to hold.143 
One might also voice a concern over the potential manipulation of 
the put option by the owner. Owners will exercise the put option, inter 
alia, when there are few good market options for disposing of the 
remainder. One might object that this opens the process up to manipula-
tion; owners will seek a government taking when compensation exceeds 
market price or when in need of liquidity. The put option can force the 
taking of the remainder of the property without the need to engage in 
lobbying (or more corrupt practices). Here again, while the argument is 
correct, it is more aptly aimed at the practice of eminent domain. When 
compensation practices are flawed, all government takings are vulnerable 
to corruption.144 The put and call options do not increase this vulnerability. 
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
In this Part, we consider several potential objections to our model. 
First, we consider whether our model is well suited to small takings, and 
we suggest the possibility of introducing a de minimis exception into our 
model, which would exempt very small takings from triggering the put 
option mechanism. Second, we consider the possible impact of our pro-
posal on state holdings of land and, in particular, whether the result 
would be excessive state holdings. 
In the background of this discussion, it is important to bear in mind 
the constitutional framework limiting state actions regarding takings. 
The formal constitutional limitations on the takings power are found in 
the Fifth Amendment.145 The two formal constitutional preconditions for 
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a taking of property are that the property must be taken for a “public 
use” and that “just compensation” must be paid to the owner.146 
However, there is a gap between these formal requirements and the 
actual law. In the law as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
the public use requirement has practically been read out of existence. 
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, any purpose that is legiti-
mate for government action is a “public use” that can justify the exercise 
of eminent domain to take property. Thus, for example, the Court stated 
in its 1954 decision Berman v. Parker, “Once the object is within the 
authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of 
eminent domain is clear. . . . Once the object is within the authority of 
Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to 
determine.”147 Upholding the rule of Berman v. Parker in its 1984 decision 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court insisted that “[t]he ‘public 
use’ requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s 
police powers,” and “where the exercise of the eminent domain power is 
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,” the Court will uphold 
its constitutionality.148 In its 2005 decision, Kelo v. City of New London, the 
Supreme Court approved of the Berman-Midkiff line of authority, citing 
both cases before stating that “[f]or more than a century, our public use 
jurisprudence has wisely . . . afford[ed] legislatures broad latitude in 
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”149 
At the same time, the Court has developed a different and unex-
pected set of restrictions on the state’s power to take property. The Fifth 
Amendment requires the payment of just compensation only when 
property is “taken” but not when it is otherwise diminished in value. Had 
it wished, the Court might have left legislatures near-absolute discretion 
in determining what a “taking” is, just as legislatures now enjoy near-
plenary authority in determining what constitutes a “public use.” Had 
the Court chosen this course, the state would be required to pay just 
compensation only if it labeled its action an exercise of the power of 
eminent domain but not if it chose to describe its action in terms of the 
government’s regulatory or taxing powers. In the landmark 1922 case 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court decided to limit the discretion 
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of the state in deciding when a government action is a taking.150 Laying 
the groundwork for what would become known as the law of “regulatory 
takings,” the Court ruled that government regulation of property may be 
deemed a “taking” if it goes “too far,” even if the legislature refuses to 
call the action an exercise of eminent domain.151 Regulatory takings law 
determines when the government has gone too far, and courts must con-
sider the action a taking, even though not labeled an act of eminent 
domain.152 
The result of judicial glosses on the Fifth Amendment is thus best 
understood as placing two limitations on government takings. First, while 
the state has near-absolute discretion in deciding when to exercise the 
power of eminent domain, its choice to refuse to label an action 
“eminent domain” will sometimes be disregarded by courts, based on the 
complex doctrines of the law of regulatory takings. Second, if the state 
does “take” property—whether due to a declared exercise of eminent 
domain or due to an action deemed a “regulatory” taking—it must pay 
just compensation to the aggrieved owner. 
A. De Minimis Takings 
The constitutional framework for takings law is crucial to bear in 
mind when considering a first potential objection to our proposal. Some 
might argue that our proposal is overkill. It requires the state to offer a 
put option to landowners, creating the possibility that the state will be 
forced to acquire the entire asset, even when the state takes only a trivial 
portion of the property. 
The rigidity of the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurispru-
dence reinforces this objection. The Supreme Court has steadfastly held 
to the view that any permanent physical occupation, slight though it may 
be, constitutes a taking for constitutional purposes (and, thus, a taking 
for which just compensation must be paid). Recall the case of Loretto, 
which involved a municipal ordinance requiring that landlords not inter-
fere with the placement of hardware and cables for cable television 
service on private residential property.153 The ordinance in question did 
not use the term “eminent domain;” it was, by all appearances, merely a 
regulation of property management. Moreover, the physical objects, 
whose placement the ordinance mandated, occupied only a few square 
inches of the building’s exterior.154 Nonetheless, the Court clung to the 
rule that a physical taking of any size demanded the payment of just 
compensation.155 In that particular case, the New York Court of Appeals, 
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upon remand, upheld the power of the commission to determine just 
compensation of a single dollar.156 
The rule that any permanent physical occupation constitutes a com-
pensable taking poses a challenge to our proposal. In its basic form, our 
model would empower owners who suffered minor permanent intrusions 
to force a sale of their entire interest to the government. Such a result is 
undesirable from a social standpoint. Most minor intrusions and occupa-
tions do not affect the characteristics or marketability of the underlying 
asset. Nor do they create a risk of strategic abuse on the part of the 
government. Hence, trifling incursions do not normally necessitate a 
transfer of ownership to the government. 
To reflect this fact, we propose that de minimis takings be exempted 
from our model. To operationalize this exemption, we would grant the 
government, in appropriate cases, the power to seek in court a declara-
tory judgment that its actions would result in a de minimis taking—an 
occupation that causes only a token harm to the owner. The owner, for 
her part, would receive an opportunity to convince the court that the 
occupation would occasion upon her more than a de minimis harm. 
Should the court grant the government its request and classify the taking 
as de minimis, no put option would be given to the owner, and, a fortiori, 
she would not be able to exercise it. On the other hand, if the court were 
to reject the government’s claim that the occupation at hand is merely de 
minimis, the owner would receive a put option and would be entitled to 
exercise it at her will within the three-month window. 
Whether a particular occupation counts as a de minimis taking 
would depend on the value of the property taken and the taking’s effect 
on the use and marketability of the property. By our lights, a case like 
Loretto would clearly come within the de minimis exception and would 
not vest a put option in the property owner. Other physical occupations 
whose impact exceeded that of Loretto would be judged based on their 
circumstances. It can be added that the partial takings examples we 
discussed in section I.A, which involved the partial takings of land for the 
expansion of roads, navigation routes, and sand dunes, would almost 
certainly fall outside the scope of de minimis takings. 
B. Government Landholdings 
A second potential objection to our proposal concentrates on the 
shortcomings of the government as a landowner. The gist of this objec-
tion is that implementation of our proposal might ultimately increase the 
landholdings of the state. Indeed, since the put option would be most 
likely exercised when the partial taking leaves an unusable remainder 
asset, our proposal might put in the hands of the government relatively 
                                                                                                                           
 156. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 432 (N.Y. 
1983). 
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unmarketable lots, since owners of such lots may disproportionately 
exercise the put option we would give them. This, in turn, might lead to 
three kinds of undesirable effects. First, the government might not be 
the optimal owner of the asset but might not be able to dispose of the 
lots transferred to it. Second, during the period in which the government 
would hold the asset, it would bear the costs of management and 
maintenance. Third, aside from the costs of management and mainte-
nance, the government might manage the land poorly or suboptimally. 
While acknowledging that the widespread availability of a put option 
might have some effect on the amount of property ultimately taken by 
the state in eminent domain actions, we believe that any fears lying 
behind this potential objection would be overblown. It must be kept in 
mind that while the put mechanism in our proposal is novel, there are 
already provisions in the laws of many states that recognize that partial 
takings may result in poor configurations of the remaining untaken 
assets. Indeed, the Uniform Eminent Domain Code requires states to 
offer to acquire the “uneconomic remnant” that remains after the 
“acquisition of only part of a property”—that is, after a partial taking.157 
While these rules require governments to expose themselves to the risk 
of acquiring more than they intended every time they engage in a partial 
taking, they do not seem to have resulted in greatly increased govern-
ment landholdings. The reason for this is twofold. First, states 
considering embarking upon partial takings are aware of the rules in 
advance and will naturally consider the potential for broader takings 
than expected. If the economic burden of the broader takings renders 
the project no longer cost effective, the state will have the option not to 
embark upon the project at all. Second, even if most takings are partial 
takings, the amount of property taken by eminent domain remains a very 
small portion of the total amount of property in the country. Even if the 
state revolutionizes its compensation practices for partial takings, the 
total effect on landholdings in the country will still remain relatively 
small. 
Additionally, the problems of government acquisitions of unmarketable 
portions of land, or “uneconomic remnants,” should not be exaggerated. It 
is the partial taking, rather than the put option, that renders the 
                                                                                                                           
 157. Unif. Eminent Domain Code § 208(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1974); see also Alaska 
Stat. § 34.60.120(9) (2016); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 9505(9) (2017); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 113-5(9) (LexisNexis 2013); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 154-C (1992); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 70-31-301(9) (2015); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, § 13(9) (West 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 57-
12-13(9) (LexisNexis 2010); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 8.26.180(9) (West 2017). 
An interesting variant can be found in Minnesota. There, the “Buy Your Farm” state 
law, which is not based on the Uniform Eminent Domain Act, allows owners of partially 
taken properties to force a purchase of the remainder within sixty days. Minn. Stat. 
§ 216E.12(4) (2016). The provision is limited in several important ways. First, it applies 
only to acts of eminent domain by utilities. Id. Second, it allows the utilities to object and 
force the dispute into district court. Id. Third, and most importantly, the district court is 
instructed not to force the sale if the remainder lacks commercial viability. Id. 
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remaining part of the asset unmarketable or uneconomic. The put option 
simply forces the state to take full account of the cost of creating such 
remnants. To the degree that this improves government decisionmaking 
about partial takings, the placement of the burden on the state ought to be 
welcomed. 
Likewise, the problem of government administration and manage-
ment of untaken portions of land should not be exaggerated. Govern-
ments already own vast amounts of land in the United States. The put 
option comes into play only if the state has already decided to engage in a 
partial taking. That is, the put option is relevant only when the state has 
already decided to increase its property holdings. 
A final note is in order about the constitutionality of the put option, 
given the broader constitutional background of the takings power. As 
should be evident from the existing provisions of the Uniform Eminent 
Domain Code, there is no reason to fear that the state lacks power to take 
the remaining land, whether in response to exercise of the put option or 
due to a new decision of the state to seize the remainder by eminent 
domain. Even if the state chooses to take the remainder only in order to 
retain useful land configurations, this is the sort of “public use” that 
would likely pass constitutional muster under the very forgiving modern 
jurisprudence of public use. If the state takes the remainder due to exer-
cise of the put option, the constitutional issue becomes even easier. 
Arguably, when the state acquires the land at the behest of the owner 
exercising the option, it is not engaging in an act of eminent domain at 
all. Rather, it is engaging in a voluntary purchase of land, which does not 
need to be justified as a “public use.” 
IV. EXTENSIONS 
In this Part, we explore several extensions to our basic proposal. 
First, we evaluate an alternative means of implementing our proposal, in 
which the option prices would be determined by self-assessment, rather 
than by the courts. Second, we explain how our model can be extended 
to partial chattel takings. Third, and finally, we consider and reject the 
possibility of using our model to regulate partial regulatory takings. 
A. Self-Assessment 
Our model is based on utilizing existing legal doctrines for apprais-
ing the value of property affected by partial takings. A more ambitious 
version of this model would offer a self-assessment mechanism that would 
enable owners of property the government intends to take to state the 
value of the taken part as a percentage of the overall value.158 In this 
                                                                                                                           
 158. For a broader discussion of the benefits of self-assessment, see generally Bell & 
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, supra note 40, at 895–900 (describing self-
assessment as an “improvement over existing takings compensation doctrine” because it 
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variant, once the government declared its intent to engage in a partial 
taking of a certain percentage (size-wise) of a private parcel, the owner 
would receive an opportunity to self-assess the value of the targeted 
portion (percentage-wise) relative to the whole. 
To illustrate how the proposed mechanism would work, assume that 
a municipality publicizes its intent to take 40% of Anne’s parcel to 
expand a local road. To this end, the government secures an appraisal of 
Anne’s entire parcel, which states that the value of the lot as a whole is 
$200,000. At this point, Anne would receive an opportunity to report her 
own assessment of the ratio of the value between the 40% portion desig-
nated to be taken and the property as a whole. For example, Anne might 
estimate that the value of the part designated for taking is not 40% of the 
whole but actually 65%. Once Anne submits her self-assessment, the 
government could choose among two different options: Either it could 
take the part it originally planned to take and pay Anne 65% of the value 
of entire lot ($130,000), or it could take the whole parcel and pay Anne 
full compensation in the amount of $200,000. Anne would also have the 
ability to exercise her put option, forcing the government to take the 
remainder of the land for an additional $70,000. We assume, for 
purposes of this example, that the government’s appraisal of the parcel 
as a whole is correct; if Anne were to litigate this appraisal, the court 
could determine a different value for the parcel as a whole, while still 
accepting Anne’s self-assessment of the relative value of the taken seg-
ment. For instance, if the court were to determine that the value of the 
lot as a whole was actually $220,000, Anne’s self-assessment of 65% would 
still stand, but the government’s choice would now be between paying 
Anne $143,000 to take the segment of the lot or paying her $220,000 and 
taking the whole lot. 
Self-assessment potentially brings two benefits.159 First, self-assessment 
lowers the cost of assessing the value of the partially taken land. Neither 
party would have to bring expert witnesses to the court, nor would the 
court have to engage in any difficult analysis of the competing 
assessments. The property owner would simply have to make a declara-
tion. Only if the parties disagreed about the value of the parcel as a 
whole would it be necessary to battle in court about appraisals, and, even 
then, the battle would be about only the value of the parcel as a whole, 
making it unnecessary to introduce any proof about the value of the 
taken segment or its interaction with the parcel as a whole. 
                                                                                                                           
“ensures the payment of full compensation to condemnees” and “represents a reduction 
in transaction costs relative to the existing regime”). 
 159. Bell & Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, supra note 25, at 300; see also Fennell, 
Taking Eminent Domain Apart, supra note 92, at 959 (noting “principles of self-
assessment might be employed to overcome the difficulties associated with forced sales in 
situations where public use is contested”); Levmore, supra note 108, at 771 (arguing self-
assessment provides an alternative to valuations by judges, tax assessors, appraisers, and 
juries, which can “generate substantial transacting costs”). 
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Second, self-assessment potentially yields a more accurate approxi-
mation of the value of the partially taken land.160 This is due to the 
strategic pressures the options create. An understatement of the value of 
the partial taking makes the partial taking cheaper for the government 
and renders it unlikely that the government will choose to seize the 
remainder of the land. There is little reason for a property owner to 
understate value in this way; the best the owner can achieve with such an 
underestimation is to later cut her losses by exercising her put, making 
the government take the entire property at the court-set price (which the 
owner could always have done under this model, irrespective of the self-
assessed price). It is more likely that a property owner would be tempted 
to overstate the value of the partially taken property. This would increase 
the compensation paid for the partial taking and therefore put more 
money in the hands of the owner, for the time being. However, the over-
estimation would also mean the untaken remainder of the property was 
underpriced. This would encourage the government to exercise its call 
option (its power of eminent domain) and take the rest of the property. 
Again, there would be little to recommend misstating the value in this 
way; while the self-assessment would encourage the government to 
exercise its call option, the owner could always exercise the put option to 
the same effect, without misstating the value. 
To be sure, the self-assessed value will be imperfect due to the 
anchoring effect of the court’s assessment of the value of the whole 
parcel. For instance, it would not make sense for an owner to attempt to 
use self-assessment to capture extra subjective value that she attaches to 
the parcel. This is because the compensation for the whole parcel will 
not include such subjective value.161 Including a large subjective value in 
the self-assessment of the partial taking would have the same effect as an 
exaggerated self-assessment: It would encourage the government to exer-
cise its call option to take the rest of the property. At that point, the 
owner would not only lose compensation for the subjective value; she 
would also lose the entire parcel. 
There is, however, one flaw with self-assessment in the context of 
partial takings. Government decisions to take property are not purely 
pecuniary.162 Even if the remainder property looks cheap due to an exag-
                                                                                                                           
 160. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, supra note 40, at 891–95 
(discussing self-assessment and strategic pressures for truthful reporting). 
 161. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 162. Even theories of “fiscal illusion,” which presume an important role for fiscal 
factors in the decision to take property, do not presume that the government will take 
property simply because the compensation that will be paid is below market. Rather, 
theorists who believe in fiscal illusion believe in the much more modest proposition that 
government decisions regarding takings are distorted by the fact that certain costs are off-
budget. “Fiscal illusion” is, itself, a highly debated phenomenon. See supra note 38 and 
accompanying text. Those who reject theories of fiscal illusion naturally would reject the 
idea that the government takes property solely because the compensation to be paid will 
be below market. 
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gerated self-assessment of the value of the partial taking on the part of 
the owner (Anne in our example), the government might still prefer to 
refrain from exercising its call option. If the owner could properly 
identify situations in which the government would refrain from taking 
the cheap remainder, it would be to her advantage to overstate the value 
of the partial taking. Such an overstatement would ensure a greater 
payment at the time of the partial taking, and the reluctance of the gov-
ernment to exercise its call option would make the owner secure in the 
belief that the overstatement will stand. 
B. Partial Chattel Takings 
Takings are not restricted to land. While our proposal presumes that 
the partially taken asset is real estate, there is nothing in the law that 
restricts partial takings to realty. Indeed, some of the most prominent 
takings controversies in recent years have involved chattels, such as 
raisins,163 intellectual property,164 and interest income on bank account 
funds.165 Yet, while it is easy to find partial takings of chattels, adapting 
our mechanism to chattel takings requires some adjustment. 
The major issue that deserves special attention in the context of 
chattels is the definition of the asset. Our proposal for options that can 
reunify a partially taken asset is driven primarily by the advantages of the 
unified asset—easier evaluation, avoidance of suboptimal configurations, 
and the like. However, assets are not defined in heaven.166 One cannot a 
priori determine what an asset in property is. Even in the context of par-
tial takings of land, defining the asset can be difficult. Land does not 
always come with clearly drawn border lines. Even in cases in which an 
individual owns one continuous area of land, the land might best be seen 
as multiple parcels. Conversely, the discrete holdings of several individ-
uals might best be seen as collectively composing a single parcel. As we 
                                                                                                                           
 163. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2056 (2013) (holding that California 
raisin farmers who were forced to forfeit the portion of their supply in excess of a 
production limit set by California’s Secretary of Agriculture could challenge the forfeiture 
under the Fifth Amendment). 
 164. See Dustin Marlan, Comment, Trademark Takings: Trademarks as Constitutional 
Property Under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1581, 1583–85 
(2013) (contending that “‘propertization’ of the trademark regime, together with 
constitutional property dimensions favorable to trademark law, supports the claim that 
trademarks ought to be subject to the Takings Clause”). But see Zoltek Corp. v. United 
States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that patent infringement cannot 
form the basis for a Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act). 
 165. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231–34, 237 (2003) (holding that 
the state of Washington was permitted to use interest on lawyers’ trust accounts for clients 
to pay for legal services for indigent litigants under the Fifth Amendment’s public use 
doctrine and that no compensation was owed). 
 166. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three 
Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1024 (2008) (discussing the role of asset 
configuration in optimizing value). 
2017] PARTIAL TAKINGS 2087 
 
discussed in the context of offsets, the law often focuses on the owner 
rather than the number of parcels in deciding whether to consider a 
taking to be partial.167 Specifically, the law may consider a taking “partial” 
when only part of an owner’s realty is taken, even though the taking is of 
one or more discrete parcels.168 
These difficulties are greatly compounded when chattels are taken. 
To be sure, there are easy cases. When discussing an automobile, for 
instance, the car as a whole is clearly a discrete asset, and if the govern-
ment sought to seize the hood, or a door, we would easily identify the 
proposed taking as a partial taking. But if the “taking” is of some or all of 
the interest paid to a bank account—the kind of taking addressed by the 
Supreme Court in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation169—it is harder 
to find an asset whose completeness is of interest to us. Of course, it is 
possible to talk about a bank account as an “undivided” asset.170 The 
seizure of half the money in a bank account could thus be described as a 
“partial taking.” But it is unclear why we should care that this taking is 
partial. The cash in a bank account—whether the full bank account or 
only half—is just as easily measured in value and just as easily used in the 
marketplace. The difficulties we described as characteristic of partial 
takings of land171 would seem inapposite. 
We therefore suggest that if our proposal were to be used in the 
context of chattel takings, it should be modified to take account of the 
difficulty in identifying assets whose wholeness should be protected. We 
suggest that the option created for a partial taking—the owner’s put—
should be created only after a preliminary examination by the court of 
the asset in question. Specifically, in order to trigger our partial takings 
mechanism, the owner would have to prove to the satisfaction of the 
court that the taken property was only a part of a larger asset, that the 
larger asset was one whose “wholeness” was valuable enough to warrant 
legal protection, and that the value of the “whole” asset could readily be 
measured by the court. Only if the court made this finding would the 
court proceed to the rest of the steps in our proposal: measuring the 
value of the asset as a whole and of the portion taken, and setting the 
strike price for the put option. 
We anticipate that, in some cases, the showing of the value of asset 
wholeness would be easy, as in the takings of part of a boat or a car. In 
other cases, such as cash, such a showing would be near impossible. 
Finally, there would be cases that lend themselves to a showing of the 
                                                                                                                           
 167. See supra section I.B.1. 
 168. See supra section I.B.1. 
 169. 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998). 
 170. E.g., In re Will of Filfiley, 313 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795–96, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (noting that 
a testator’s “undivided half is not readily alienable and he can under no circumstances 
convey the whole without his joint tenant joining in the deed”). 
 171. See supra section I.C. 
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importance of “wholeness” but are not always clear cut, such as the 
seizure of shares of a corporation or a share of a piece of intellectual 
property. 
C. Partial Regulatory Takings 
Our model has concerned itself so far with physical seizures of prop-
erty, whether land or chattels. In this section, we assess the applicability 
of our model to regulatory takings. 
Regulatory takings doctrine is perhaps the most complex doctrine 
within the world of takings and, indeed, one of the most controversial 
and difficult in the world of law.172 Generally speaking, regulatory takings 
doctrine is designed to identify situations in which a government actor 
negatively influences the value of property while purporting to exercise a 
power other than the power of eminent domain.173 
According to the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the gov-
ernment must pay “just compensation” to any owner whose property is 
“taken for public use” but not to owners whose property values are 
affected by non-“takings.”174 This is true for many state constitutions as 
well.175 Naturally, seizures of property by eminent domain are “takings.”176 
But government regulation of property may be deemed a “taking” as well, 
if it goes “too far.”177 The problem and the controversy lie in determining 
when government action goes “too far.” 
Courts developed a variety of doctrines to help draw the line 
between actions that have gone too far—regulatory takings that are 
unconstitutional unless accompanied by the payment of just compensa-
                                                                                                                           
 172. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine, 22 Ecology L.Q. 89, 90 (1995) (arguing for the negation of regulatory 
takings); Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 1, 1 (2003) 
(describing regulatory takings doctrine as “famously incoherent”); Daniel A. Farber, 
Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 Const. Comment. 279, 279 (1992) (“[T]akings 
doctrine is a mess.”); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 
Stan. Envtl. L.J. 525, 529–30 (2009) (noting the “messiness” of regulatory takings doctrine 
and suggesting that it is inevitable); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 
Colum. L. Rev. 2182, 2186 (2004) (“Takings Clause jurisprudence is characterized by 
nothing if not the confusion and intense disagreement it generates.”); Carol M. Rose, 
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 561–
62 (1984) (calling takings “[b]y far the most intractable constitutional property issue”). 
 173. For a comprehensive discussion, see generally Fischel, supra note 42; Bill 
Higgins, Inst. for Local Gov’t, Regulatory Takings and Land Use Regulation: A Primer for 
Public Agency Staff 6 (2006), http://mrsc.org/getmedia/FB8A8201-E2CC-453B-BE00-
AECEFA196562/m58takings.aspx [http://perma.cc/3Z6X-SHL7]. 
 174. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 175. See generally Nakagiri, supra note 145, at 15, 18–19 (contending that “state 
takings provisions arguably provide greater protection of private property than does the 
federal Takings Clause”). 
 176. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
 177. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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tion to owners—and those that have not—exercises of the regulatory 
power whose burdens must be suffered by owners.178 
Two rules are particularly important for our analysis of partial 
takings. One of these rules is the “total wipeout” rule established by 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.179 According to the ruling in Lucas, 
a government action that completely wipes out all commercial value of 
property is a per se taking, for which compensation must be paid.180 By 
contrast, the approach generally followed in cases in which there is no 
wipeout is the balancing test established by Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City.181 Under the Penn Central approach, there are no hard-
and-fast rules on identifying a regulatory taking. Instead, courts must 
make case-by-case determinations by evaluating the facts in light of three 
case-specific factors: the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions, the nature of the government action, and the degree of diminution 
in property value.182 
Questions associated with partial takings are particularly relevant to 
the issue of partial regulatory takings. Two clusters of potential partial 
regulatory takings cases can be identified. 
One cluster involves regulations that do not wipe out all commercial 
value of a property in perpetuity but do wipe out all value for a period of 
time or all value of some of the property. Consider, for instance, the case 
of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.183 In Palazzolo, the Court had to consider 
whether the owner of seventy-four lots of land (the result of subdividing 
three parcels that had been bought together) could claim the benefit of 
the total wipeout rule when some of the downland lots had lost all their 
commercial value, while some of the upland lots retained significant 
value.184 As in all cases of partial regulatory takings, the Court declined to 
find a total wipeout. Instead, the Court ruled that all the lots should be 
considered together for purposes of the taking (just as courts rule that 
all lots should be considered together for purposes of evaluating the 
applicability of the offset doctrine in cases of partial takings185) and that 
since some value was retained, there was no total wipeout.186 Similarly, in 
                                                                                                                           
 178. See e.g., Raymond R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A 
Biological and Cultural Analysis, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 20, 20–22 (1998) (discussing the 
rules used to determine when regulation requires payment of compensation under the 
Takings Clause). 
 179. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 180. Id. There are some exceptions to this rule, such as total wipeouts that are 
attributable to abating a nuisance that would traditionally have been recognized as such. 
See Coletta, supra note 178, at 79 n.283. 
 181. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 182. Id. 
 183. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 184. Id. at 613–16. 
 185. See supra section I.B.1. 
 186. Palazollo, 533 U.S. at 630–31. 
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the case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, the Court considered a regulation that wiped out all commercial 
value of certain lands during a moratorium period in which no construc-
tion was allowed.187 The moratorium was lifted after several years, and on 
that basis, the Court determined that there had been no total wipeout.188 
A second, and broader, cluster of cases involves what is known as the 
“parcel as a whole” rule, or the “denominator problem.”189 This cluster 
of cases involves court interpretations of the prong of the Penn Central 
balancing test that requires courts to consider the degree to which the 
regulation has diminished property value.190 In order to assess diminu-
tion in property value, courts must first determine the baseline from 
which such diminution is to be measured. The facts of Penn Central are 
illustrative. In Penn Central, the Court considered whether an early 
historic-preservation law (New York’s Landmarks Preservation Law) had 
worked a regulatory taking by forbidding development of Grand Central 
Station in New York.191 The Court engaged in an explicitly “ad hoc” 
factual inquiry that examined many aspects of the particular property.192 
One argument that the property owner raised in its own favor was that 
the regulation essentially deprived the Penn Central Transportation 
Company of all ability to profit from air rights above Grand Central 
Station.193 The Court was unsympathetic. The Court insisted that what 
ought to be examined is the “parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block 
designated as the ‘landmark site.’”194 In other words, the Court said when 
courts evaluate whether a regulation unduly diminishes property value, 
courts should aggregate, rather than disaggregate, the owner’s holdings. 
Courts should not be bound by the manner in which the land is divided 
for future potential deeds; rather, courts should aggregate related pieces 
of land into a single “whole parcel.” Obviously, the more land aggregated 
into the “whole parcel,” the less any single regulation will be thought to 
have proportionately diminished its value.195 
                                                                                                                           
 187. 535 U.S. 302, 311–12 (2002). 
 188. Id. at 330–31. 
 189. See Michelman, supra note 42, at 1192; Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for 
Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant 
Parcel Analysis, 34 Envtl. L. 175, 190–91, 218 (2004). 
 190. Wright, supra note 189, at 188. 
 191. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115–17 (1978). 
 192. Id. at 124. 
 193. Id. at 130. 
 194. Id. at 131. 
 195. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631–32 (2001) (“The case comes to 
us on the premise that petitioner’s entire parcel serves as the basis for his takings claim, 
and, so framed, the total deprivation argument fails.”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1016–17 & n.7 (1992) (discussing whether an owner who cannot develop 90% 
of his tract “has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion 
of the tract, or . . . has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole”). 
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The “parcel-as-a-whole” rule, and more generally partial regulatory 
takings, has been subject to fierce scholarly debate.196 Some have sug-
gested that the Court artificially reduced the likelihood that a regulation 
will be viewed as a regulatory taking and decried the judicial deference.197 
Others have celebrated the Court for seeing through an obvious 
manipulation, denying owners the ability to engage in pretend divisions 
of the property (conceptual severance, in Margaret Radin’s felicitous 
phrase198) and thereby blocking artificial inflation of regulatory takings 
claims. Be that as it may, the judicial approach to date has been clear. 
According to the courts, there are no “partial regulatory takings.” A 
regulatory taking, if it occurs, relates to the entirety of the affected asset. 
We have to consider the whole of the asset. Even if there is a partial 
wipeout of value, or a total wipeout for a limited time (whose limits are 
not initially known), it’s a matter for the balancing test. 
Land is considered to have been either subject to a “regulatory 
taking” or not subject to such a taking.199 One cannot divide things up 
and say that part has been subject to a regulatory taking and another part 
has not. The contrast to physical takings could not be sharper. Courts 
consider the physical seizure of even a very small part of a large parcel a 
per se taking, for which just compensation must be paid.200 But the 
                                                                                                                           
 196. See David Dana, Why Do We Have the Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule, 39 Vt. L. Rev. 617, 
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Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity and Ownership and the Parcel as a Whole, 36 Vt. 
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regulatory taking of a huge portion of value of a parcel is not necessarily 
a taking,201 and the effects must be considered for the “parcel as a 
whole.” 
One might imagine an extension to our proposal in which we would 
tackle partial regulatory takings just as we suggest treating partial physical 
takings. A call option in the hands of the government and a put option in 
the hands of the owner would accompany any regulation that diminished 
property value. This would bring a completely new approach to “whole 
parcel” questions. Essentially, a parcel would be whole if the owner 
wanted it to be such (as proved by exercise of the put) but not otherwise. 
Unfortunately, however, we cannot see how our proposal can easily 
be transferred to the world of partial regulatory takings. The greatest 
problem is establishing the strike price. Unlike in cases of partial physical 
takings, “partial regulatory takings” do not require courts to assess pre-
cisely the value of the land rights taken. Except in the unlikely case in 
which the regulatory action is challenged as a regulatory taking, the 
courts may entirely ignore the value of the “taking.” Even in the context 
of a regulatory takings challenge, the Penn Central test does not require a 
precise measure of the value of the “taking” in order to determine 
whether a regulatory taking has taken place; it is sufficient for courts to 
use generalized statements.202 Creating a mechanism for setting the strike 
price for the put and call options could thus be prohibitively expensive. 
Moreover, we acknowledge that bringing our proposal to the world 
of regulatory takings would profoundly alter the world of regulation. 
Property regulation is ubiquitous.203 Potentially, every zoning change, or 
even property tax, is a regulatory taking.204 Giving the owner a put option 
to force a sale of her entire interest to the government whenever the 
government regulates property would turn every regulation into a taking 
(at the option of the owner). This would vastly expand the category of 
compensable regulatory takings. The administrative and judicial costs 
arising from the implementation of such a scheme would likely be enor-
mous. We, therefore, caution against applying our model to regulatory 
takings. The boundary between physical and regulatory takings also 
demarcates the limits of our model. 
CONCLUSION 
The ubiquity of partial takings, together with the unique challenges 
they present, creates a clear case for creative solutions to longstanding 
problems posed by this important land use tool. A close inspection of 
current partial takings law reveals a handful of specialized doctrines that 
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courts adopted on an ad hoc basis to address specific problems without 
much attention to systemic effects and, in particular, to the misalignment 
these doctrines create between partial takings and total takings. Despite 
their immense practical significance, the takings world has largely 
ignored partial takings. This is unfortunate. The current approach fails 
to do justice to partial takings and comes at a significant cost to society. 
In this Article, we carefully reviewed the defining characteristics of 
partial takings and then built upon our findings to devise a novel 
approach to partial takings that balances social and private interests. The 
key element of our approach is the creation of a new option that would 
empower the owner of the partially condemned lot, if she so chooses, to 
force the government to purchase the remainder of the asset. Per our 
proposal, the exercise of this option would be voluntary, which means 
that owners would exercise it only if doing so would be desirable. Our 
mechanism would guarantee that the layout of the affected parcels would 
not be distorted by partial takings that threaten to leave a remainder that 
is unusable or unmarketable. Our mechanism, when exercised by the 
owner, would also have the salutary effect of transferring the title to the 
taken parcel as a whole to a new single owner—namely, the govern-
ment—giving it the full panoply of rights and powers that come with a 
fee simple interest. Finally, our proposal would reduce the transaction 
and litigation costs that currently attend instances of partial takings. 
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